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The Middle East’s New Eruption

Podcasts Jan 21, 2020 Narges Bajoghli , Vali Nasr, and Elmira Bayrasli

Fears of an escalated conflict between the United States and Iran have quieted in the weeks since a US drone strike killed Qassem Suleimani, but the assassination’s long-term consequences remain the subject of heated speculation. What did US President Donald Trump overlook when he ordered the killing of Iran’s second-most powerful leader?

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Narges Bajoghli

Narges Bajoghli is an assistant professor of Middle East Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and the author of Iran Reframed: Anxieties of Power in the Islamic Republic.

Vali Nasr

Writing for PS since 2020
2 Commentaries

Vali Nasr, Professor of Middle East Studies and International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, is a former senior adviser in the US State Department and the author of The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat.

Elmira Bayrasli

Writing for PS since 2016
3 Commentaries

Elmira Bayrasli is the co-founder and CEO of Foreign Policy Interrupted and the author of From The Other Side of The World: Extraordinary Entrepreneurs, Unlikely Places.

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j. von Hettlingen Jan 24, 2020

Elmira Bayrasli interviews two Iranian academics in the US – Vali Nasr and Narges Bajoghli – who discuss whether the current standoff between Iran and the US, following the killing of Iran’s second most powerful man, General Qassem Suleimani will erode Tehran’s influence, and how it seeks to move forward. Unless the US and Iran find a way to put past grievances behind, animosity and mutual mistrust will persist and escalate the conflict.
Nasr explains why Iran came to see the US as its existential threat since the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), in which the US armed Saddam Hussein, hoping to defeat the fledgling Islamic Republic. Even after Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against Iran, the US and the UN had kept the atrocities under the radar. It has to do with the 1979 revolution and the hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran that had left a permanent scar on the American psyche to date.
With hawks in Washington vowing to topple the regime in Tehran, and Iranians remembering the 1953 coup engineered by the CIA to oust the democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mossadeq, Iranians were convinced that the US looked for regime change. Feeling threatened by the US military presence in the Middle East, Suleimani who had fought against Saddam in the 1980s, created a Shia corridor, empowering proxy militias from Lebanon, Syria to Iraq, with the goal of making lives difficult for US troops and driving them out of Iraq.
What Trump has failed to realise is that the US can no longer rely on Sunni Arab states – due to open fissures mong them, they lack unity – to contain or confront Iran. In fact some of them had reached out to Tehran, in order to ease tensions. Even Saudi Arabia is contemplating a rapprochement with Iran. After Trump’s withdrawal from Syria – seen as an utter betrayal of the Kurds – they realise the US is no longer a dependable ally.
Trump has squandered much of America’s goodwill by taking the US out of the nuclear deal in 2018, that Iran signed with world powers in 2015. In his delusion he believes his maximum pressure would force Iran to negotiate a deal to his liking, without realising that his perfidy has once again dissuaded Russia and North Korea from negotiating with the US. He will have a hard time to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear programme and Russia to negotiate a new deal with the US that covers “tactical” nuclear weapons.
If the US remains in the region with the pretext of fighting ISIS, which is seeing a resurgence in parts of Iraq, there will be a “three way battle” between ISIS, Iran and the US. As both the two antagonists see each other as a greater threat, ISIS will benefit from this battle. Iran certainly sees the US as a greater threat than ISIS. Its defence strategy would be not to waste its resources in fighting ISIS. The US would be fighting on its own - perhaps with the Kurds - but without the Iran-backed Shiite militias in the region.
The US and Iran would need to change the nature of their relations and find common ground to cooperate. America’s containment strategy does not work in Iran, because the US does not want to increase its resources in a region it lacks strong allies.
Bajoghli explains why Suleimani came to become an icon among Iranians, since the emergence of the Islamic State and the threat ISIS posed. Focusing on bolstering Iran’s military strength abroad, he was above the political frail in Iranian domestic politics, which is marked by intrigues. Thanks to propaganda, he became a household name and his death dealt a huge blow to ordinary citizens, allowing the leadership to gain sympathy from the public.
Another thorn in Iran’s side is Trump’s lack of understanding of Iran’s history and culture. Under Suleimani Iran has expanded its clout in the region, fostering a sense of nationalism at home. It explains why Iranian leaders feel snubbed by the West for showing no respect for their country. Iranians feel also outraged that they had been denied the right to acquire a nuclear programme, which the leadership said were for peaceful purposes. The coup in 1953 allowed the US and the UK to lay their hands on Iran’s oil with the blessing of the Shah. After this humiliation they feel entitled to develop their country and be treated with respect.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
j. von Hettlingen Jan 24, 2020

Elmira Bayrasli interviews two Iranian academics in the US – Vali Nasr and Narges Bajoghli – who discuss whether the current standoff between Iran and the US, following the killing of Iran’s second most powerful man, General Qassem Suleimani will erode Tehran’s influence, and how it seeks to move forward. Unless the US and Iran find a way to put past grievances behind, animosity and mutual mistrust will persist and escalate the conflict.
Nasr explains why Iran came to see the US as its existential threat since the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), in which the US armed Saddam Hussein, hoping to defeat the fledgling Islamic Republic. Even after Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against Iran, the US and the UN had kept the atrocities under the radar. It has to do with the 1979 revolution and the hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran that had left a permanent scar on the American psyche to date.
With hawks in Washington vowing to topple the regime in Tehran, and Iranians remembering the 1953 coup engineered by the CIA to oust the democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mossadeq, Iranians were convinced that the US looked for regime change. Feeling threatened by the US military presence in the Middle East, Suleimani who had fought against Saddam in the 1980s, created a Shia corridor, empowering proxy militias from Lebanon, Syria to Iraq, with the goal of making lives difficult for US troops and driving them out of Iraq.
What Trump has failed to realise is that the US can no longer rely on Sunni Arab states – due to open fissures mong them, they lack unity – to contain or confront Iran. In fact some of them had reached out to Tehran, in order to ease tensions. Even Saudi Arabia is contemplating a rapprochement with Iran. After Trump’s withdrawal from Syria – seen as an utter betrayal of the Kurds – they realise the US is no longer a dependable ally.
Trump has squandered much of America’s goodwill by taking the US out of the nuclear deal in 2018, that Iran signed with world powers in 2015. In his delusion he believes his maximum pressure would force Iran to negotiate a deal to his liking, without realising that his perfidy has once again dissuaded Russia and North Korea from negotiating with the US. He will have a hard time toi convince North Korea to give up its nuclear programme and Russia toi negotiate a new deal with the US that covers “tactical” nuclear weapons
If the US remains in the region with the pretext of fighting ISIS, which is seeing a resurgence in parts of Iraq, there will be a “three way battle” between ISIS, Iran and the US. As both the two antagonists see each other as a greater threat, ISIS will benefit from this battle. Iran certainly sees the US as a greater threat than ISIS. Its defence strategy would be not to waste its resources in fighting ISIS. The US would be on its own, without the Iran-backed Shiite militias in the region.
The US and Iran would need to change the nature of their relations and find common ground to cooperate. America’s containment strategy does not work in Iran, because the US does not want to increase its resources in a region it feels isolated.
Bajoghli explains why Suleimani came to become an icon among Iranians, since the emergence of the Islamic State and the threat ISIS posed. Focusing on bolstering Iran’s military strength abroad, he was above the political frail in Iranian domestic politics, which is marked by intrigues. Thanks to propaganda, he became a household name and his death dealt a huge blow to ordinary citizens, allowing the leadership to gain sympathy from the public.
Another thorn in Iran’s side is Trump’s lack of understanding of Iran’s history and culture. Under
Suleimani Iran has expanded its clout in the regime, fostering a sense of nationalism at home. It explains why Iranian leaders feel snubbed by the West for showing no respect for their country. Iranians feel also outraged that they had been denied the right to acquire a nuclear programme, which the leadership said were for peaceful purposes. The coup in 1953 allowed the US and the UK to lay their hands on Iran’s oil with the blessing of the Shah. They feel entitled to be a developed country and be treated with respect.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.

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The Middle East’s New Eruption

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