Despite the high cost of defending Ukraine, voters on both sides of the Atlantic – including Republicans in the United States – remain surprisingly united in their support for the country – and for the broader transatlantic alliance. If NATO unravels, its undoing will not reflect popular sentiment.
PARIS – If 2025 goes down as the year the transatlantic alliance broke down, future historians will marvel at just how far national leaders strayed from the “grassroots” in Europe and America. Despite the heavy cost of defending Ukraine’s sovereignty – and even as most Europeans have lost faith in the United States as a reliable ally – voters on both sides of the Atlantic remain surprisingly united in their support for the beleaguered country. As talks proceed between the US, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Germany, popular support for Ukraine will be a key finding to bear in mind.
In surveys we conducted across the US and four major European countries this month, we found that clear majorities in all countries still back the key tenets of the NATO alliance. Only among far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) voters and US Republicans do significant pockets of disagreement emerge; and even in these cases, voters are divided.
If US President Donald Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance wanted to rattle and divide Europeans, the strategy appears to have backfired. Germany’s incoming chancellor, Friedrich Merz, is widely known as the “Atlanticist’s Atlanticist,” and even he is urging Europeans to declare “independence” from the US.
Fractious and exhausted as Europeans are after three years of war on the continent, they have been galvanized by the Trump administration’s swerve toward Russia. Only around one-quarter of French and Germans now see the US as an ally. And even in Britain, those who do are no longer a majority. Europeans finally seem prepared to go it alone, with majorities in every country we polled saying they want to support Ukraine even if America pulls out.
Public attitudes in the US are even more striking. When it comes to Ukraine, Americans broadly agree with Europeans. While 5% of Republican voters say they feel more sympathetic toward Russia, more than ten times as many Republicans sympathize with Ukraine. Only one in four Americans want the US to stop helping Ukraine. On the questions of who bears the blame for the war, how best to serve one’s national interests, how the war should end, and who can be trusted to secure a peace agreement, there is more common ground than disagreement.
For example, pluralities of Americans, Germans, French, and Britons support sending troops to act as peacekeepers in Ukraine – though a large share in all countries (aside from the United Kingdom) oppose such a deployment, as is to be expected. Moreover, even most Republicans agree that Russia is the aggressor, and majorities on both sides of the Atlantic – and within every political bloc – view Putin as a dictator. Majorities in Europe and the US, including among Republicans, also believe that Ukraine’s defense of its sovereignty matters for their own country, and most – even among Trump’s own base – worry that Russia could soon invade other countries in Europe.
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Finally, when it comes to possible peace talks, a majority of Europeans and Americans believe that Ukraine should be at the negotiating table. One in five, or fewer, think the US should be engaging in peace talks with Russia that exclude Ukraine.
Where there are differences, they emerge mostly over Trump’s character and general approach to politics. Here, his loyal MAGA base makes itself known. Whereas large majorities of Britons, Germans, French, Poles, and US Democrats think Trump’s handling of the war has been poor, 71% of Republicans think the opposite. Only among Republicans does a majority believe that a deal brokered by Trump in Ukraine would be good for the US. Fewer than one in five Republicans thought Trump was more disrespectful than his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, when they clashed in the Oval Office. By contrast, three-quarters of US Democrats and majorities or pluralities in every European country thought so.
The other country with significant pockets of divergence from transatlantic values is Germany, where the AfD made strong electoral gains after drawing praise from Vance and an endorsement by Elon Musk. Only 33% of AfD supporters blame Russia for the war. The party, especially its East German voter base, shows a strong affinity for Putin and his regime. But this makes them the exception that proves the rule. The AfD is out of step with other Germans, and even with other populist parties in Europe, such as National Rally in France or Reform UK.
Americans and Europeans are not polarized when it comes to the war in Ukraine or the transatlantic alliance. If NATO does not survive the Trump presidency, its undoing will not be due to a rift between polities, but rather to decisions made by a small group of elites. That may point to a more fundamental divide in Western democracies: between hard-core partisans and the rest of us.
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PARIS – If 2025 goes down as the year the transatlantic alliance broke down, future historians will marvel at just how far national leaders strayed from the “grassroots” in Europe and America. Despite the heavy cost of defending Ukraine’s sovereignty – and even as most Europeans have lost faith in the United States as a reliable ally – voters on both sides of the Atlantic remain surprisingly united in their support for the beleaguered country. As talks proceed between the US, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Germany, popular support for Ukraine will be a key finding to bear in mind.
In surveys we conducted across the US and four major European countries this month, we found that clear majorities in all countries still back the key tenets of the NATO alliance. Only among far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) voters and US Republicans do significant pockets of disagreement emerge; and even in these cases, voters are divided.
If US President Donald Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance wanted to rattle and divide Europeans, the strategy appears to have backfired. Germany’s incoming chancellor, Friedrich Merz, is widely known as the “Atlanticist’s Atlanticist,” and even he is urging Europeans to declare “independence” from the US.
Fractious and exhausted as Europeans are after three years of war on the continent, they have been galvanized by the Trump administration’s swerve toward Russia. Only around one-quarter of French and Germans now see the US as an ally. And even in Britain, those who do are no longer a majority. Europeans finally seem prepared to go it alone, with majorities in every country we polled saying they want to support Ukraine even if America pulls out.
Public attitudes in the US are even more striking. When it comes to Ukraine, Americans broadly agree with Europeans. While 5% of Republican voters say they feel more sympathetic toward Russia, more than ten times as many Republicans sympathize with Ukraine. Only one in four Americans want the US to stop helping Ukraine. On the questions of who bears the blame for the war, how best to serve one’s national interests, how the war should end, and who can be trusted to secure a peace agreement, there is more common ground than disagreement.
For example, pluralities of Americans, Germans, French, and Britons support sending troops to act as peacekeepers in Ukraine – though a large share in all countries (aside from the United Kingdom) oppose such a deployment, as is to be expected. Moreover, even most Republicans agree that Russia is the aggressor, and majorities on both sides of the Atlantic – and within every political bloc – view Putin as a dictator. Majorities in Europe and the US, including among Republicans, also believe that Ukraine’s defense of its sovereignty matters for their own country, and most – even among Trump’s own base – worry that Russia could soon invade other countries in Europe.
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At a time of escalating global turmoil, there is an urgent need for incisive, informed analysis of the issues and questions driving the news – just what PS has always provided.
Subscribe to Digital or Digital Plus now to secure your discount.
Subscribe Now
Finally, when it comes to possible peace talks, a majority of Europeans and Americans believe that Ukraine should be at the negotiating table. One in five, or fewer, think the US should be engaging in peace talks with Russia that exclude Ukraine.
Where there are differences, they emerge mostly over Trump’s character and general approach to politics. Here, his loyal MAGA base makes itself known. Whereas large majorities of Britons, Germans, French, Poles, and US Democrats think Trump’s handling of the war has been poor, 71% of Republicans think the opposite. Only among Republicans does a majority believe that a deal brokered by Trump in Ukraine would be good for the US. Fewer than one in five Republicans thought Trump was more disrespectful than his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, when they clashed in the Oval Office. By contrast, three-quarters of US Democrats and majorities or pluralities in every European country thought so.
The other country with significant pockets of divergence from transatlantic values is Germany, where the AfD made strong electoral gains after drawing praise from Vance and an endorsement by Elon Musk. Only 33% of AfD supporters blame Russia for the war. The party, especially its East German voter base, shows a strong affinity for Putin and his regime. But this makes them the exception that proves the rule. The AfD is out of step with other Germans, and even with other populist parties in Europe, such as National Rally in France or Reform UK.
Americans and Europeans are not polarized when it comes to the war in Ukraine or the transatlantic alliance. If NATO does not survive the Trump presidency, its undoing will not be due to a rift between polities, but rather to decisions made by a small group of elites. That may point to a more fundamental divide in Western democracies: between hard-core partisans and the rest of us.