In Donald Trump’s White House and broader orbit, there are three differing views on how to engage with Venezuela: one is focused on restoring democracy, another has embraced pragmatism, and a third supports military intervention. The view that prevails will likely reflect all three.
WASHINGTON, DC – Venezuela’s future will be largely shaped by US policymakers and lobbyists over the next year. Although Donald Trump’s administration has yet to formulate a unified position on the country, it will probably do so sooner rather than later, given the many important US interests at stake. These include Venezuela’s vast oil reserves and high prevalence of drug trafficking and organized crime; its government’s assault on democracy and human rights (which has resulted in heavy US sanctions); the historic exodus of millions of Venezuelans; and China’s growing influence in the region.
In Trump’s White House and broader orbit, there are three differing views on how to engage with Venezuela. One group, led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, views the restoration of democracy as the main US policy objective. By contrast, pragmatism defines the approach of Richard Grenell, whom Trump recently appointed as his presidential envoy for special missions, a new position focused on some of the world’s “hottest spots,” including Venezuela and North Korea. A more hawkish view, espoused by a variety of informal groups and individuals, supports military action against Venezuela. Two former presidents of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe Vélez and Iván Duque Márquez, have recently espoused this view.
Rubio, a former presidential hopeful who ran against Trump in the 2016 Republican primary, has ample foreign-policy experience, having been a longtime member of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees. Perhaps most important, Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants and a staunch anti-communist, has devoted considerable attention to Latin American affairs, thus bringing a deep knowledge of the region, its problems, and its leaders to his post as the top US diplomat.
As Rubio explained during his confirmation hearing, the United States must rethink its approach to Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s regime, which he views not as a government, but as “a narco-trafficking organization that has empowered itself [as] a nation-state.” Rubio lambasted Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden: “I was in strong disagreement with the Biden administration because they got played the way that I knew they would get played.” Maduro reneged on the promises he made during negotiations with the US, including by holding a sham election last July and cracking down on opposition leaders and protesters after they disputed the result. Moreover, Rubio added, the US granted special licenses to Chevron and other oil firms to operate in Venezuela, which are “providing billions of dollars” for “the regime’s coffers.”
But Grenell, who served as US ambassador to Germany during Trump’s first term and was briefly acting director of national intelligence in 2020, doesn’t see the harm in maintaining open lines of communication. On the day Trump was sworn in, Grenell wrote on X: “[D]iplomacy is back. I’ve spoken to multiple officials in Venezuela today and will begin meetings early tomorrow morning. Talking is a tactic.” Recently, he flew to Caracas where he met with Maduro and secured the release of six American detainees. Meanwhile, Mauricio Claver-Carone, Trump’s designated envoy for Latin America, insisted that there was no “quid pro quo … it’s not a negotiation in exchange for anything.”
The third and more aggressive option is US military intervention. While none of the top officials in Trump’s cabinet publicly supports this idea, it is still bandied about in policy circles. Since all peaceful means have been exhausted, the thinking goes, the only alternative is to unseat Maduro and his cronies by force. But proponents of military action in Venezuela have offered no realistic proposals, leaving more questions than answers about how this would work in practice.
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Most fundamentally, it seems unlikely that the Trump administration will act militarily against the Maduro regime. On the campaign trail and now as president, Trump has repeatedly pledged “no new wars.” As he put it in his inaugural address: “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end – and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier.”
But Trump’s promises and statements leave the door open for the US to make full use of the cyber, commercial, financial, diplomatic, and, yes, military tools at its disposal. But officials should learn from the Biden administration’s abject failures. For example, the sanctions imposed on Venezuela during Biden’s presidency were poorly designed and executed by bureaucrats who had limited access to the centers of power. Other countries played a diminished, and mostly symbolic, role in these efforts.
As for which view will prevail, I suspect the answer is probably a mix of all three. There will inevitably be tension between those who advocate leaving Maduro in power while negotiating aggressively with him, and those who regard his ouster as non-negotiable. Regardless, it seems reasonable to expect a flurry of diplomatic activity, the use of well-worn tools, lobbying by business interests, and – given Trump’s capriciousness – some unprecedented measures.
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WASHINGTON, DC – Venezuela’s future will be largely shaped by US policymakers and lobbyists over the next year. Although Donald Trump’s administration has yet to formulate a unified position on the country, it will probably do so sooner rather than later, given the many important US interests at stake. These include Venezuela’s vast oil reserves and high prevalence of drug trafficking and organized crime; its government’s assault on democracy and human rights (which has resulted in heavy US sanctions); the historic exodus of millions of Venezuelans; and China’s growing influence in the region.
In Trump’s White House and broader orbit, there are three differing views on how to engage with Venezuela. One group, led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, views the restoration of democracy as the main US policy objective. By contrast, pragmatism defines the approach of Richard Grenell, whom Trump recently appointed as his presidential envoy for special missions, a new position focused on some of the world’s “hottest spots,” including Venezuela and North Korea. A more hawkish view, espoused by a variety of informal groups and individuals, supports military action against Venezuela. Two former presidents of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe Vélez and Iván Duque Márquez, have recently espoused this view.
Rubio, a former presidential hopeful who ran against Trump in the 2016 Republican primary, has ample foreign-policy experience, having been a longtime member of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees. Perhaps most important, Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants and a staunch anti-communist, has devoted considerable attention to Latin American affairs, thus bringing a deep knowledge of the region, its problems, and its leaders to his post as the top US diplomat.
As Rubio explained during his confirmation hearing, the United States must rethink its approach to Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s regime, which he views not as a government, but as “a narco-trafficking organization that has empowered itself [as] a nation-state.” Rubio lambasted Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden: “I was in strong disagreement with the Biden administration because they got played the way that I knew they would get played.” Maduro reneged on the promises he made during negotiations with the US, including by holding a sham election last July and cracking down on opposition leaders and protesters after they disputed the result. Moreover, Rubio added, the US granted special licenses to Chevron and other oil firms to operate in Venezuela, which are “providing billions of dollars” for “the regime’s coffers.”
But Grenell, who served as US ambassador to Germany during Trump’s first term and was briefly acting director of national intelligence in 2020, doesn’t see the harm in maintaining open lines of communication. On the day Trump was sworn in, Grenell wrote on X: “[D]iplomacy is back. I’ve spoken to multiple officials in Venezuela today and will begin meetings early tomorrow morning. Talking is a tactic.” Recently, he flew to Caracas where he met with Maduro and secured the release of six American detainees. Meanwhile, Mauricio Claver-Carone, Trump’s designated envoy for Latin America, insisted that there was no “quid pro quo … it’s not a negotiation in exchange for anything.”
The third and more aggressive option is US military intervention. While none of the top officials in Trump’s cabinet publicly supports this idea, it is still bandied about in policy circles. Since all peaceful means have been exhausted, the thinking goes, the only alternative is to unseat Maduro and his cronies by force. But proponents of military action in Venezuela have offered no realistic proposals, leaving more questions than answers about how this would work in practice.
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Most fundamentally, it seems unlikely that the Trump administration will act militarily against the Maduro regime. On the campaign trail and now as president, Trump has repeatedly pledged “no new wars.” As he put it in his inaugural address: “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end – and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier.”
But Trump’s promises and statements leave the door open for the US to make full use of the cyber, commercial, financial, diplomatic, and, yes, military tools at its disposal. But officials should learn from the Biden administration’s abject failures. For example, the sanctions imposed on Venezuela during Biden’s presidency were poorly designed and executed by bureaucrats who had limited access to the centers of power. Other countries played a diminished, and mostly symbolic, role in these efforts.
As for which view will prevail, I suspect the answer is probably a mix of all three. There will inevitably be tension between those who advocate leaving Maduro in power while negotiating aggressively with him, and those who regard his ouster as non-negotiable. Regardless, it seems reasonable to expect a flurry of diplomatic activity, the use of well-worn tools, lobbying by business interests, and – given Trump’s capriciousness – some unprecedented measures.