Trouble over Taiwan

Transcript

Archive Recording: The US and China appear to be entering dangerous territory over Taiwan.

Archive Recording: Tensions have flared around the Taiwan Strait.

Archive Recording: We’re talking about the giant issue of Taiwan.

Archive Recording: The main story tonight concerns Taiwan.

Archive Recording: Taiwan’s [premier] Su Tseng-chang says that the island needs to be on alert in response to what he called China’s over-the-top military activities and violations of regional peace. He was speaking after a four-day period in which nearly 150 Chinese war planes flew into Taiwan’s air-defense zone.

Archive Recording: Never before have so many Chinese planes come so close to Taiwan.

Archive Recording, US President Joe Biden: I just want to make China understand that we are not going to step back. We are not going to change any of our views.

Archive Recording: So are you saying that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if China attacked?

Archive Recording, US President Joe Biden: Yes, yes we have a commitment.

Archive Recording: The White House has walked back on Joe Biden’s latest remark on Taiwan.

Archive Recording, Jen Psaki: Well, there has been no shift. The president was not announcing any change in our policy, nor has he made a decision to change our policy. There’s no change in our policy.

Bonnie Glaser: Hi. How are you?

BG: Well, Taiwan was part of China under the Qing dynasty. So this goes back to the 1900s. And Japan ruled Taiwan from 1895 until the end of World War II. And in 1945, Japan essentially surrendered Taiwan. And there are these disputes about whether Taiwan’s sovereignty was actually returned to China. Taiwan was actually handed over to Chiang Kai-shek, who at the time was the [Kuomintang] KMT general. He was still fighting a war with the communists. But China claims that based on the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Declaration that China has indisputable sovereignty over Taiwan.

BG: Well, in 1992, there were representatives from Taiwan and from China who met to talk about the relationship. And at the time, the party in Taiwan that was in power was the Nationalist party or the KMT. And they negotiated this agreement, because both sides agree that Taiwan and China are part of the same country – or Taiwan and mainland China, to be more correct, are part of the same country. And the Taiwan side believed at the time – and the KMT still holds this position – that the country that both sides are part of is called the Republic of China. And the Chinese side, of course, believes that the country that both sides are part of should be called the People’s Republic of China. But they essentially agreed, “Well, we’ll agree to disagree. We won’t emphasize what we’re going to call this one country. We’ll just agree that both sides belong to the same country, and we’ll set aside our differences, and on that basis, we will try to develop better relations.”

And the KMT was in power then in Taiwan, of course, from 1992 until 2000, when Taiwan had its first president from the Democratic Progressive Party. And the DPP has never really accepted that Consensus, and relations were tense and contentious between Taiwan and mainland China during the eight years that Chen Shui-bian was president. And then we went back to having a KMT leader for eight years, and they went back to agreeing on the 1992 Consensus.

And then, of course, in 2016, we had another leader come to power, again from the DPP, the pro-independence party in Taiwan, and she didn’t want to embrace this 1992 Consensus. In this new era, Beijing has many more tools that it can use to coerce Taiwan to return to that 1992 Consensus. So, we’ve seen the tensions really ratchet up between the two sides of the Strait as China has used diplomatic and military and sometimes even economic tools to pressure Taiwan. But at the moment, that 1992 Consensus is in abeyance. If another KMT president were elected in Taiwan, it is likely that there would be a return to that understanding of the 1992 Consensus.

Archive Recording: The new Chinese leadership revealed, led by President-in-Waiting Xi Jinping.

Archive Recording: To Hong Kong now, where protesters are once again gathering to voice their fury at a highly controversial bill that would allow extraditions to mainland China.

Archive Recording: They shot tear gas and pepper spray, swung batons, and fired rubber bullets.

Archive Recording: There are growing fears the Chinese government may use the military to crack down on protesters in Hong Kong.

Archive Recording: The ruling Chinese party are imposing a new National Security Law on that city. It’s meant to crack down on any opposition to the government.

Archive Recording: We knew this was coming, but details of the legislation were only published after it came into effect.

BG: Xi Jinping’s immediate goal is to prevent Taiwan independence. Of course, Taiwan is, we could agree I think, perhaps a de facto independent country, but it does not in legal terms have an independent status. There are today 14 countries, plus the Vatican, that recognize Taiwan, and the rest of the countries in the world recognize the People’s Republic of China. So, the immediate goal is to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent and having other countries around the world, especially the United States, support Taiwan as an independent country.

But the longer term goal is definitely reunification. And Xi Jinping has said in many statements that a reunification is a necessary requirement for China’s national rejuvenation. And Xi Jinping has set a deadline: that rejuvenation should take place by 2049, the middle of this century. And China has in the past used many positive inducements to try to persuade Taiwan to integrate more with the mainland – first economically, and then hopefully politically. But that has basically failed. So Xi Jinping is increasingly relying on more of these coercive means. He wants to compel Taiwan to engage in political talks on reunification. But there’s really a debate, I think, among experts as to whether or not Xi Jinping is willing to pay a very high cost for seeking reunification and whether or not he would use force to achieve it because, after all, he’d risk war with the United States if he did so, as well as the possibility even of failure.

BG: Well, let’s clarify US policy. The United States had a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan from 1954 to 1979 and broke diplomatic ties with the Republic of China, Taiwan, in 1979 and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. And at that time, [the US] created something that we call the Taiwan Relations Act. And that’s been the basis of US policy toward Taiwan ever since 1979. And some people do mistake that the United States actually has a commitment to defend Taiwan, but the TRA is online. Anybody can read it. It just obligates the United States to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan and, I think, also importantly, to maintain the capability itself – that is the United States – to prevent coercion against Taiwan.

And I think, you know, presidents have often gone beyond the contents of the Taiwan Relations Act. In 2001, President George W. Bush pledged to do “whatever it took,” he said – whatever it took, whatever it takes – to defend Taiwan. And President Biden has said on several occasions that he would defend Taiwan. But the policy is one of strategic ambiguity. US presidents just don’t say in advance whether they would defend Taiwan. And that is believed to be part of what has actually helped preserve the peace ever since 1979, when the US did break diplomatic ties with Taiwan. So, every president is always concerned about strengthening deterrence. If they’re smart, they’re also concerned about providing some reassurance.

Archive Recording: The US is pushing to up its arms sales to Taiwan as part of an effort known within the Pentagon as Fortress Taiwan.

Archive Recording: The United States is planning to sell as many as seven major weapon systems to Taiwan, including mines, cruise missiles, and drones, according to Reuters sources.

Archive Recording: Observers claim that the potential arms deal is important to US President Donald Trump in his foreign-policy legacy.

Archive Recording: For the first time in four decades, a Taiwan representative attended the presidential inauguration. The island calls it another milestone in deepening ties.

Archive Recording: China has told the United States to stop any military contact with Taiwan. The warning comes after President Tsai Ing-wen confirmed for the first time that some American troops are stationed on the island. Beijing says that that amounts to foreign interference.

BG: Well, let’s start with the second question. I have no doubt that China believes that the United States would defend Taiwan and that the [People’s Liberation Army] PLA has been planning for decades based on the likelihood that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense.

In fact, the PLA developed capabilities to deter the United States – what we call anti-access area-denial capabilities – that would make it very costly for US military assets to be operating anywhere near Taiwan and mainland China. And they tried to achieve that goal even before they developed more advanced amphibious landing capabilities to land on Taiwan, which would be necessary if they want to actually control it. So they have been assuming that yes, there would be a US effort to defend Taiwan, and they have tried to deter that effort, or at least to make it very costly.

You know, one example would be the DF-26 and DF-21 carrier-killer missiles that the Chinese have actually tested in the South China Sea against moving targets. So of course, the goal is to send a message to the United States: if you sail your carriers anywhere near us, we are going to be able to destroy them. So that’s a capability that was definitely aimed at deterring and preventing US intervention.

It’s my view that the United States would, under most circumstances, come to Taiwan’s defense. And there’s many reasons for that. One is that Taiwan is a vibrant democracy. It’s one of the few places in the world that has transitioned from an authoritarian government to a fully democratic government.

Taiwan, of course, is very strategically located. It is not very far from the southern-most island of Yonaguni of Japan, and Japan sees Taiwan as a potential existential issue for Japan’s security. So that if Taiwan were taken over by China, that would just be seen as an existential threat by Japan. And we of course have commitments to Japan under our security and defense treaty with Japan. So if we stood by and didn’t do anything, Japan – and probably other countries – would conclude that we’re not very much of a reliable partner. How can we say that we have extended deterrence, for example, which is both conventional and nuclear, if we have not actually come to the defense of Taiwan when it was under threat, should that scenario occur? So I think that’s another main reason why the United States is likely to come to defense if the Chinese threatened to attack.

BG: Well, I think that the hope is by building coalitions that push back against China’s assertive behavior and signal Beijing that countries around the world have an interest in the preservation of peace and security in the Taiwan Strait, that that will make it more likely that Xi Jinping will take those factors into account and will therefore pause before considering the use of force against Taiwan and will instead rely on other tools to advance goals of reunification and, hopefully, open dialogue with the government in Taiwan. So I think that’s the plan. If this is just a US-China issue, then it will be more difficult to keep the peace than if that issue is internationalized.

BG: Well, the first domestic factor is keeping the Chinese Communist Party in power. Some people would argue that there is pressure on Xi Jinping to reintegrate Taiwan with the motherland. But I’m not totally convinced of that. I’m not sure that the people in China really want to send their sons – their only children – to potentially die in a war over Taiwan. I think that the leadership in China might be concerned about the possibility of an anti-China coalition or even alliance of sorts forging against China if it were to use force against Taiwan. So I think the leadership has to worry about that.

There’s also the potential downturn of the economy. A war, I think, would divert Xi Jinping from his other agenda items. And Xi Jinping has prioritized, for example, dominating technologies like AI and semiconductors and autonomous vehicles, quantum computing. The peacetime competition is really important for China. They need to have a stable domestic and international environment. And in fact, Xi Jinping just stated this explicitly in a speech that he gave on the 110th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution. This is when the nationalist government was established. And so he very explicitly said China really does need a stable domestic and international environment.

So I just think that the risks for Xi Jinping are really quite high. And I don’t think that if he fails to reunify Taiwan with the mainland during his time in office – and he could be leader for life, we don’t know that, but he may just be there for a third term or maybe even a fourth term, that would be ten years – I just don’t see any evidence that he has decided that reunification is the necessary piece for his legacy.

Archive Recording: For people in Taiwan, this is their proudest moment.

Archive Recording: Taiwan this Saturday will have its first genuinely democratic elections in that country’s history.

Archive Recording: This is the new rough-and-tumble world of politics in Taiwan. In their parliament, clashes of ideas sometimes become clashes with fists.

Archive Recording: Taiwan is on track to end 2020 on a high.

Archive Recording: Taiwan’s economy saw its strongest expansion in nearly ten years last quarter as global demand for its tech products surged.

Archive Recording: President Tsai Ing-wen officially began her second term on Wednesday after winning re-election by a landslide in January’s elections. In her inauguration speech, Tsai said Taiwan and China had reached a historical turning point in their relationship.

Archive Recording: Tsai said Taiwan could not accept being part of China under the “one country, two systems” framework proposed by Beijing. She said that both sides had a duty to find a way to coexist.

BG: Oh, that’s a great question. The Taiwanese people, for a long time, really wanted to have a good relationship with China. They wanted more trade, economic relations. Students wanted to go there to study. The salaries for young people were higher in mainland China, and people felt that they had a better future. Lots of people went. There’s over one million Taiwanese living in mainland China.

The investment is huge. Over the course of decades, billions of dollars have been invested. And many Taiwanese companies are indispensable to mainland China’s economy – like Foxconn and Taiwan Semiconductor Corporation, for example – they have huge factories, you know, in China producing parts for iPhones and cars and batteries and things of that nature. And the Taiwanese people, for a long time, really supported that.

But in 2014, there was an effort by the prior president who was under the KMT – he was Ma Ying-jeou – who he was really trying to push greater economic interdependence between the two sides and particularly a new economic and trade agreement. And there was a backlash in Taiwan. Some of the younger people took control of the legislature. This came to be known as the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan. And since then, there’s been quite a bit of wariness about excessive economic dependence.

And if we include Hong Kong, almost 44% today of Taiwanese exports go to mainland China and Hong Kong and Macau. And that’s just excessive, I think, for any country. So President Tsai has been trying to reverse that. She has been pursuing what’s called the New Southbound Policy to develop more economic relations with Southeast Asia and South Asia. They made some headway before the pandemic, but I think the pandemic has set them back a bit. Though this is an important goal that I think she will continue to push for.

When she was running for re-election, her poll numbers originally were really quite low. There was a lot of dissatisfaction, not only in the opposition party – among people who supported them – but also within her own party, of some of her policies. And then came Hong Kong. And President Tsai Ing-wen, as she was running for re-election, really pointed to what was going on in Hong Kong and said, “Wow, this is a really a threat to Taiwan. We could be next.” And it was really successful.

So, you know, the question going forward is after she finishes her second term – which by law, Taiwan’s president can only serve two four-year terms each – and so we don’t know, is Taiwan going to get another DPP president? Is it going to get a president from the KMT?

The KMT has struggled to win support from young people and they struggled to put out a vision that is appealing. Because again, since the attitudes now toward mainland China have changed, what is the KMT going to run on? In the past, they have actually supported reunification with China, and very few people in Taiwan want that. So they need to redefine themselves and put out a vision for Taiwan that is more than what they have put forward in the past.

But I don’t rule out that there could be another KMT president in Taiwan, either in 2024 or 2028. The people of Taiwan today are not completely happy with their current president, Tsai Ing-wen. It is very much like the United States and democracy, and there are so many issues that are controversial that have led to diminishing support for her.

Archive Recording: Now alarm bells are ringing in Taiwan. Chinese President Xi Jinping says the islands reunification with China will happen at some point.

Archive Recording: He said peaceful reunification was the ultimate goal, but warned Beijing wasn’t afraid to use force if necessary. He added that Taiwan’s independence would lead to disaster.

Archive Recording: China is upping the ante on Taiwan.

Archive Recording: Amid rising cross-Strait tensions, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson announced that those who are diehard supporters of Taiwan independence will be punished according to the law.

Archive Recording: China has now decided to sanction the top Taiwanese officials after accusing them of being stubbornly pro Taiwan independence.

BG: I don’t think that there will be much impact of this public naming of Taiwanese who are seen as – they’ve been labeled “stubbornly” pro Taiwan independence by Beijing. There’s three individuals: Taiwan’s current premier, Su Tseng-chang, the speaker of their parliament or legislature, You Si-kun, and then there’s the foreign minister, Joseph Wu. And the Chinese, I think, are just trying to signal that – they want to signal to their people that they can control what’s going on in Taiwan, and there’s really no danger of Taiwan independence. As I said earlier, their top priority is to prevent Taiwan independence. And if Xi Jinping is seen as being soft on this issue, then that could damage him. So I think the real reason for doing this is A, domestic, and B, to try to warn future leaders and senior officials in Taiwan to not be so anti-China and take measures that are damaging to cross-Strait relations.

Frankly, I don’t think it will deter people from the DPP. They don’t take this kind of labeling as “stubbornly pro Taiwan independence” very seriously. China has said it will enforce punishment for those that are on the list by not letting them enter the mainland, not letting them visit Macau or Hong Kong. But this is not the first time that China has imposed sanctions. It’s the first time they’ve imposed these kinds of sanctions on Taiwan, but they have imposed sanctions on parliamentarians and officials and even individual scholars in Europe and also in the United States. And we have yet to see how China is going to try to enforce those sanctions. So people are watching this. My guess is that this is more bark than bite.

BG: I agree with all that. It’s probably the best outcome for the time being. We should all try to kick the can down the road. Taiwan’s situation is not ideal. There is certainly growing support in Taiwan for independence, but independence for Taiwan is not achievable in the near term, and it would be dangerous if any government in Taipei really did pursue policies that aim to achieve legal de jure independence.

So my view is that we should try to work with other countries to advance Taiwan’s interests where we can. That means things like in international organizations, like up at the United Nations and agencies affiliated with the UN, we should support meaningful participation for Taiwan – but not membership, because you have to be a sovereign state, you know, to be a member of the World Health Organization or the International Civil Aviation Organization or Interpol, for that matter. So we should try and help Taiwan to participate in meaningful ways, be an observer where that capacity, that role, exists. But no, we shouldn’t be pushing for Taiwan to become an independent sovereign state in the eyes of the international community. And I think this is doable.

It’s going to be more difficult going forward. This is going to be harder and harder to navigate, with China amassing more diplomatic, economic, and military power. But I think that we can deter China. At the same time, reassure it that we’re not supporting independence for Taiwan. And we can help Taiwan preserve its prosperity for its people, its democracy. But Taiwan has to understand that it has to do its part to preserve stability. And President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan completely understands that. The problem is that we don’t know whether there is a future ruler, a potential candidate for president in Taiwan, who will manage this relationship with China as carefully as she has.

BG: Thanks for having me.