Two years ago the world cheered as Slobodan Miloševic's opponents united to overthrow his dictatorship. Opposition to Milosevic, however, appears to have been the sole glue holding them together. Those protest leaders, now in power, have been at each other's throats ever since.
Vojislav Koštunica, the current president of what remains of Yugoslavia and the `mildish' nationalist who out-polled Miloševic two years ago, holds a high-profile job with numerous ceremonial duties but little real power. So he decided to compete head-to-head in Serbia's presidential elections of September 29 with the reform candidate Miroljub Labus, a vice-premier in charge of finance. Because Koštunica did not win 50% plus one of the votes of all registered voters in the first round, he faces a run-off with Labus on October 13th.
Intelligent speeches, spirited debates and clever slogans were conspicuous by their absence in this election. Violence was also absent, but insults were not. For example, Zoran Djindjic, the hyper-pragmatic prime minister of Serbia who supports Labus, called Koštunica a lazy drone. Such language is lamentable, but it is still a big step forward from the Miloševic era, when both regime and opposition commonly dubbed their opponents as traitors, spies, or Western mercenaries.
Look beyond the insults and you see that Koštunica and Labus have similar moderate programs. Labus favors faster economic reform and is readier to accept Western demands to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal. Koštunica is also for privatization and decreasing the role of the state, but he is more worried about corruption and favoritism during the sale of state firms. While he claims to be pro-Western, he prefers that extraditions of indicted Serb war criminals to the Hague conform to Serbian law.
The biggest electoral surprise of the first round was the success of the blood-curdling nationalist Vojislav Sešelj, who received 24% of the vote. For years he championed extreme Serbian nationalism and led paramilitary formations in the wars of Yugoslavia's disintegration. He also instigated many violent incidents in Serbian internal politics. Last but not least, Sešelj was in coalition with Miloševic when the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, a loose coalition of 18 opposition parties led by Koštunica but internally dominated by Djindjic, defeated Miloševic.
Sešelj has worked hard to soften his image. He remains a nationalist, but the main theme of his electoral campaign was the struggle against organized crime and his promise to purge the police of dishonest high-ranking officers.
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Sešelj was much helped by Miloševic who, from his cell in the Hague, urged his Socialist Party to vote for Sešelj, not for one of its own two quarrelling candidates. Miloševic's shrewd, pugnacious cross-examination of witnesses in the Hague courtroom has somewhat restored his prestige among Serbs who perceive the Tribunal as anti-Serb. The good news is that Miloševic's support for Sešelj damaged the already weak Socialist Party, which is unlikely to recover soon.
Sešelj was also the only major politician who spoke about the plight of the unemployed and the soon-to-be-unemployed, of the refugees and the homeless, and of the poor. He did this in a demagogical, nationalistic and populist way. But it is obvious that in the period of transition through which Serbia is going, there is a need for a strong, well-organized European-style social-democratic party to address these issues.
Most of Sešelj's supporters will vote for Koštunica in the second round because they view Labus as a lackey of Americans and Germans, of the IMF and World Bank, and simply of Serbia's enemies the world over. Since most people who voted for the eight minor candidates in the first round will also cast ballots for Koštunica, he is all but certain to win. This certainty means that Koštunica need not actively court Sešelj supporters or other nationalists.
Koštunica has made a career more by the absence of negative characteristics than by what he has achieved. He is neither corrupt nor a war criminal, neither aggressive in his utterance and behavior nor likely to bend the law for the sake of personal power. Many people voted by for him by default, both now and when he defeated Miloševic in 2000.
Though he does not sacrifice major moral principles for power, Koštunica is not the unassuming lawyer he once was. He crams his party with mediocrities, selects mostly bad advisers, and does not listen to the rare good ones. It is possible that his image as a right-of-center democrat conceals a reactionary who would like for Serbia to restore its pre-WWII monarchy and for the Orthodox Church to play a major role in political and social life.
For there is a deep contradiction at the core of Koštunica, as there is at the core of Serbian society - an impossible dream of combining liberal European political institutions with authoritarian Serbian political traditions. It should not be forgotten that Koštunica supported the struggle of Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo and that he adheres to a rosy picture of Serb history.
But Parliament is the seat of real political power here. After the parliamentary elections that will probably take place in the spring of 2003, Koštunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) will be a formidable force in the Serbian assembly. But it will never come close to an absolute majority.
Neither Serbs nor the West want a government in which Sešelj or someone like him plays a leading role. So Koštunica and Djindjic cannot seek allies in the nationalist camp. Both Djindjic and Koštunica must ultimately realize that they are stuck with each other and so begin to compromise and cooperate. If they do Serbia will sail on - slowly, without spectacular successes, in a disorderly way, but peacefully and in the right direction.
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Two years ago the world cheered as Slobodan Miloševic's opponents united to overthrow his dictatorship. Opposition to Milosevic, however, appears to have been the sole glue holding them together. Those protest leaders, now in power, have been at each other's throats ever since.
Vojislav Koštunica, the current president of what remains of Yugoslavia and the `mildish' nationalist who out-polled Miloševic two years ago, holds a high-profile job with numerous ceremonial duties but little real power. So he decided to compete head-to-head in Serbia's presidential elections of September 29 with the reform candidate Miroljub Labus, a vice-premier in charge of finance. Because Koštunica did not win 50% plus one of the votes of all registered voters in the first round, he faces a run-off with Labus on October 13th.
Intelligent speeches, spirited debates and clever slogans were conspicuous by their absence in this election. Violence was also absent, but insults were not. For example, Zoran Djindjic, the hyper-pragmatic prime minister of Serbia who supports Labus, called Koštunica a lazy drone. Such language is lamentable, but it is still a big step forward from the Miloševic era, when both regime and opposition commonly dubbed their opponents as traitors, spies, or Western mercenaries.
Look beyond the insults and you see that Koštunica and Labus have similar moderate programs. Labus favors faster economic reform and is readier to accept Western demands to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal. Koštunica is also for privatization and decreasing the role of the state, but he is more worried about corruption and favoritism during the sale of state firms. While he claims to be pro-Western, he prefers that extraditions of indicted Serb war criminals to the Hague conform to Serbian law.
The biggest electoral surprise of the first round was the success of the blood-curdling nationalist Vojislav Sešelj, who received 24% of the vote. For years he championed extreme Serbian nationalism and led paramilitary formations in the wars of Yugoslavia's disintegration. He also instigated many violent incidents in Serbian internal politics. Last but not least, Sešelj was in coalition with Miloševic when the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, a loose coalition of 18 opposition parties led by Koštunica but internally dominated by Djindjic, defeated Miloševic.
Sešelj has worked hard to soften his image. He remains a nationalist, but the main theme of his electoral campaign was the struggle against organized crime and his promise to purge the police of dishonest high-ranking officers.
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Sešelj was much helped by Miloševic who, from his cell in the Hague, urged his Socialist Party to vote for Sešelj, not for one of its own two quarrelling candidates. Miloševic's shrewd, pugnacious cross-examination of witnesses in the Hague courtroom has somewhat restored his prestige among Serbs who perceive the Tribunal as anti-Serb. The good news is that Miloševic's support for Sešelj damaged the already weak Socialist Party, which is unlikely to recover soon.
Sešelj was also the only major politician who spoke about the plight of the unemployed and the soon-to-be-unemployed, of the refugees and the homeless, and of the poor. He did this in a demagogical, nationalistic and populist way. But it is obvious that in the period of transition through which Serbia is going, there is a need for a strong, well-organized European-style social-democratic party to address these issues.
Most of Sešelj's supporters will vote for Koštunica in the second round because they view Labus as a lackey of Americans and Germans, of the IMF and World Bank, and simply of Serbia's enemies the world over. Since most people who voted for the eight minor candidates in the first round will also cast ballots for Koštunica, he is all but certain to win. This certainty means that Koštunica need not actively court Sešelj supporters or other nationalists.
Koštunica has made a career more by the absence of negative characteristics than by what he has achieved. He is neither corrupt nor a war criminal, neither aggressive in his utterance and behavior nor likely to bend the law for the sake of personal power. Many people voted by for him by default, both now and when he defeated Miloševic in 2000.
Though he does not sacrifice major moral principles for power, Koštunica is not the unassuming lawyer he once was. He crams his party with mediocrities, selects mostly bad advisers, and does not listen to the rare good ones. It is possible that his image as a right-of-center democrat conceals a reactionary who would like for Serbia to restore its pre-WWII monarchy and for the Orthodox Church to play a major role in political and social life.
For there is a deep contradiction at the core of Koštunica, as there is at the core of Serbian society - an impossible dream of combining liberal European political institutions with authoritarian Serbian political traditions. It should not be forgotten that Koštunica supported the struggle of Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo and that he adheres to a rosy picture of Serb history.
But Parliament is the seat of real political power here. After the parliamentary elections that will probably take place in the spring of 2003, Koštunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) will be a formidable force in the Serbian assembly. But it will never come close to an absolute majority.
Neither Serbs nor the West want a government in which Sešelj or someone like him plays a leading role. So Koštunica and Djindjic cannot seek allies in the nationalist camp. Both Djindjic and Koštunica must ultimately realize that they are stuck with each other and so begin to compromise and cooperate. If they do Serbia will sail on - slowly, without spectacular successes, in a disorderly way, but peacefully and in the right direction.