As expansion of the EU approaches, many Europeans see in it only things to be feared: masses of economic migrants, and poor countries demanding subsidies. But Europe's new eastern members can also act as a beacon for the Union, as Jacques Rupnik suggests.
It is often argued that Continental Europe's social and economic model, which seeks to combine competitiveness with solidarity, is the glue that binds the European Union together, as well as distinguishing Europe from the American (or Anglo-Saxon) free-market model. Clearly, Europe's answer to globalization is that certain spheres of social life-say, healthcare, education, the environment, or culture-cannot be left to the whip of the market.
On the surface it seems that Europe's steady integration proceeded in parallel with the development of the welfare state. But this is misleading: the European social model is, in fact, part and parcel of the identity of the EU member states more than of the EU per se.
Some, indeed, suggest that the EU often acts to erode the welfare state. This fear contributed to the reluctance of countries like Denmark and Sweden to embrace greater European integration. In both countries, majorities voted against adopting the euro because they feared that national welfare norms would become curtailed.
So, across Europe, a key question is this: what is the future of the European "social market" model? Can it survive once the Union expands from 15 members to 25?
Many EU members look at the newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe and see countries that largely try to adhere to the liberal, free-market model. Having spent a decade dismantling the debris of state socialism, most of these countries chafe at the idea of importing the European social market's idea of solidarity via the EU.
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Their position goes beyond political philosophy. A bit of opportunism is also at work, for they undoubtedly also oppose EU regulation of taxation and social norms, adoption of which would deny them their comparative advantage for Western investors.
With zero growth and 10% unemployment, Western Europe's "Rhineland model" is no longer what countries seeking to undertake root-and-branch social and economic reform want to emulate. If Europe's social market model is to survive enlargement, it must find a way to expand eastward with the EU. But this can be accomplished only if the model is reformed in the West.
Two factors could help the EU move in the right direction. First, the newcomers share a problem that undermined the social market model in Western Europe: demographic decline and, consequently, the prospect of soaring health and pension costs. The populations of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Estonia are aging and declining just as quickly as the populations of Spain or Italy. So the need to reform health and pension systems is similar in all of these countries.
Second, public attitudes toward the social market system are remarkably similar in both Eastern and Western Europe. According to the Pew Global Attitude survey, there is a significant degree of convergence between East-Central Europeans and West Europeans concerning the balance between the market and a state-guaranteed social safety net.
If the newcomers are to embrace the social market model, that model must operate throughout the EU and offer to them what it offered new EU members in the past. Sadly, this is not yet the case.
Instead, EU enlargement is being carried out according to what might be described as the principle of "asymmetrical integration." The asymmetry facilitated an eastward transfer of EU norms and institutional convergence, but no commensurate transfer of resources. EU regulatory power has taken precedence over its redistributive powers.
But the Union's regulatory authority is likely to be accepted by the accession countries only if it remains tied to the redistributionist ethic at the heart of the EU's social model. Regulation without redistribution could undermine the EU's legitimacy among the newcomers.
A report for the Chair of the EU Commission by a team of experts led by Jacques Sapir argued explicitly for a reorientation of the Union's "cohesion" policies eastwards, i.e. , in favor of those who most need them. Clearly, if the social market model is to expand eastward - thereby ensuring its viability within the whole Union - this is the only viable alternative.
But this idea threatens current beneficiaries of EU redistributive policies, namely Spain (which now gets over a third of Union cohesion funds) and Greece (which gets about a fifth), as well as Ireland. Countries that benefited most from European solidarity over the past twenty years are thus the least eager to share with their poor Eastern relations.
The old European social model is in tatters. Its reform - or, rather, its re-invention - implies redefining what solidarity means, within both the member states and the EU as a whole. But for reform to succeed, a little old-fashioned solidarity extended Eastwards now is the best way to ensure the commitment of the EU's newest members to European integration.
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As expansion of the EU approaches, many Europeans see in it only things to be feared: masses of economic migrants, and poor countries demanding subsidies. But Europe's new eastern members can also act as a beacon for the Union, as Jacques Rupnik suggests.
It is often argued that Continental Europe's social and economic model, which seeks to combine competitiveness with solidarity, is the glue that binds the European Union together, as well as distinguishing Europe from the American (or Anglo-Saxon) free-market model. Clearly, Europe's answer to globalization is that certain spheres of social life-say, healthcare, education, the environment, or culture-cannot be left to the whip of the market.
On the surface it seems that Europe's steady integration proceeded in parallel with the development of the welfare state. But this is misleading: the European social model is, in fact, part and parcel of the identity of the EU member states more than of the EU per se.
Some, indeed, suggest that the EU often acts to erode the welfare state. This fear contributed to the reluctance of countries like Denmark and Sweden to embrace greater European integration. In both countries, majorities voted against adopting the euro because they feared that national welfare norms would become curtailed.
So, across Europe, a key question is this: what is the future of the European "social market" model? Can it survive once the Union expands from 15 members to 25?
Many EU members look at the newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe and see countries that largely try to adhere to the liberal, free-market model. Having spent a decade dismantling the debris of state socialism, most of these countries chafe at the idea of importing the European social market's idea of solidarity via the EU.
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At a time of escalating global turmoil, there is an urgent need for incisive, informed analysis of the issues and questions driving the news – just what PS has always provided.
Subscribe to Digital or Digital Plus now to secure your discount.
Subscribe Now
Their position goes beyond political philosophy. A bit of opportunism is also at work, for they undoubtedly also oppose EU regulation of taxation and social norms, adoption of which would deny them their comparative advantage for Western investors.
With zero growth and 10% unemployment, Western Europe's "Rhineland model" is no longer what countries seeking to undertake root-and-branch social and economic reform want to emulate. If Europe's social market model is to survive enlargement, it must find a way to expand eastward with the EU. But this can be accomplished only if the model is reformed in the West.
Two factors could help the EU move in the right direction. First, the newcomers share a problem that undermined the social market model in Western Europe: demographic decline and, consequently, the prospect of soaring health and pension costs. The populations of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Estonia are aging and declining just as quickly as the populations of Spain or Italy. So the need to reform health and pension systems is similar in all of these countries.
Second, public attitudes toward the social market system are remarkably similar in both Eastern and Western Europe. According to the Pew Global Attitude survey, there is a significant degree of convergence between East-Central Europeans and West Europeans concerning the balance between the market and a state-guaranteed social safety net.
If the newcomers are to embrace the social market model, that model must operate throughout the EU and offer to them what it offered new EU members in the past. Sadly, this is not yet the case.
Instead, EU enlargement is being carried out according to what might be described as the principle of "asymmetrical integration." The asymmetry facilitated an eastward transfer of EU norms and institutional convergence, but no commensurate transfer of resources. EU regulatory power has taken precedence over its redistributive powers.
But the Union's regulatory authority is likely to be accepted by the accession countries only if it remains tied to the redistributionist ethic at the heart of the EU's social model. Regulation without redistribution could undermine the EU's legitimacy among the newcomers.
A report for the Chair of the EU Commission by a team of experts led by Jacques Sapir argued explicitly for a reorientation of the Union's "cohesion" policies eastwards, i.e. , in favor of those who most need them. Clearly, if the social market model is to expand eastward - thereby ensuring its viability within the whole Union - this is the only viable alternative.
But this idea threatens current beneficiaries of EU redistributive policies, namely Spain (which now gets over a third of Union cohesion funds) and Greece (which gets about a fifth), as well as Ireland. Countries that benefited most from European solidarity over the past twenty years are thus the least eager to share with their poor Eastern relations.
The old European social model is in tatters. Its reform - or, rather, its re-invention - implies redefining what solidarity means, within both the member states and the EU as a whole. But for reform to succeed, a little old-fashioned solidarity extended Eastwards now is the best way to ensure the commitment of the EU's newest members to European integration.