BELGRADE: Slobodan Milosevic may be the most despised man in Serbia, but leaders of the country's opposition can barely hide their hatred for each other. Indeed, as Vuk Draskovic, the leader of the largest opposition group, tried to hijack last week's massive protest of 100,000 in Belgrade (a rally he had previously shunned), security men from Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement and Zoran Djindjic's Democratic Party openly scuffled. Forging a united front against the regime seems as remote as ever.
The feuds and incompetence of the Serbian opposition are the main reasons why Milosevic still rules. Since the expulsion of a quarter-of-a-million Serbs from Krajina by the Croatian Army in the summer of 1995, less than one-third of the electorate has backed him. But the vanity, greed, and perpetual scheming of the opposition's leaders has left them easy prey for Milosevic's schemes of divide-and-misrule.
Because of this political failure, many fear that Serbia faces civil war. Yet the abyss can be avoided. While the Serbian police force is huge and well-armed, it is ill-trained and psychologically ill-prepared to suppress mass demonstrations. In the Army, only the top generals are unconditionally loyal to Milosevic; most of the officer corps is embittered at the lost Kosovo war and at Milosevic's dismissive treatment of them, particularly their low pay.
Last but not least, it is not obvious that Milosevic is prepared to resort to large scale violence within Serbia. As opposed to his dealings with non-Serbs, this wily authoritarian's preferred methods of domestic political struggle are unscrupulous manipulation of friend and foe, bribery, propaganda, and electoral fraud. Almost sixty years-old and in power for more than a decade, he is unlikely to change. After all, although many believed that his indictment by the Hague War Crimes Tribunal, announced during the bombing of Serbia, would make him fight to the bitter end, he yet accepted unconditional surrender.
Here is Milosevic's Achilles heel. The irony of last Thursday's opposition rally is that it took place in front of Belgrade's federal parliament, for it is in parliament and not the streets that Milosevic can be challenged. In this regard, it is a pity that Montenegro's pro-Western president Milo Djukanovic has chosen a separatist path, rather than help Serbia's opposition.
For Djukanovic holds a possible key to eviscerating Milosevic's stranglehold on government. Because there are no direct elections for the top two federal offices in what remains of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro agreed in 1992 to share them. If the Yugoslav president is Serbian, the premier must be from Montenegro. The trouble with current premier Momcilo Bulatovic is that his party gained fewer votes in Montenegro's elections than Djukanovic's party. He got his job because Milosevic fiddled. Almost all Serb opposition leaders agree with Djukanovic's complaint that the federal government is illegitimate because of this state of affairs.
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Djukanovic prefers an illegitimate federal government because it strengthens his argument for secession. But if he were to work with Serbia's opposition (by pledging, say, to postpone Montenegro's bid for independence if a legitimate prime minister is named), and focus public protests on installing a new premier, Yugoslavia could rid itself of Milosevic in a rather elegant way.
Since the Constitution of Yugoslavia gives little power to the president, a new premier from Montenegro could adopt the opposition's agenda. Milosevic would be squeezed into a ceremonial presidential role. Once Milosevic was stripped of real power, his Socialist Party would seek a new leader; the road would be open for Milosevic's removal.
Djukanovic is a perfect figure to lead the opposition because, as a Montenegin, he poses no threat to the career ambitions within Serbia of Draskovic, Djindjic, and retired General Momcilo Perisic. But Djukanovic keeps the Serbian opposition at a distance. So many opposition politicians hope to get rid of Milosevic through street protests.
The most vocal advocate of this is Mladjan Dinkic, the energetic leader of an economic think tank called G 17. He argues that street protests should combine with a general strike. Parliament would then vote Milosevic and the government out and appoint a government of experts. These would struggle with Serbia's problem for one year, then withdraw from public life. Elections would be held and democratic politics would begin.
The naive part of this plan is the assumption that MPs from Milosevic's Socialist Party, the Yugoslav United Left (the small but influential party of Mrs. Milosevic) and Vojislav Seselj's ultra-nationalist Radical Party, would vote against their government and for a new one from which they could not benefit. Even if this miracle were to happen, who can prevent these MPs from voting against the new government in a few months or only a few weeks time? Finally, Serbs like leaders who can inspire and communicate with them. They would never follow unknown technocrats.
The governing coalition of President Milosevic seems ready to accept early elections. Perhaps it fears that its popularity will further decline, and would prefer to go into elections while it still has the advantages of counting the votes, controlling state television, and establishing electoral districts.
That part of the opposition led by Draskovic also wants elections, but doesn't reject the idea of an interim government. This, Draskovic says, should result from a compromise between Milosevic and the opposition. Draskovic is right. Unless Montenegro's Djukanovic can be prevailed upon to work with the opposition in order to strip Milosevic of power by stripping him of his puppet prime minister, elections and compromises are the way to a democratic Serbia. Street protests should concentrate on getting from Milosevic fair conditions for elections and acceptance of international monitoring (but, needless to say, not from NATO countries).
In this way, even without joining into a coalition, opposition parties could get a majority of seats in parliament. What the new government would then look like is difficult to know, but it certain that Milosevic would not be its leader.
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BELGRADE: Slobodan Milosevic may be the most despised man in Serbia, but leaders of the country's opposition can barely hide their hatred for each other. Indeed, as Vuk Draskovic, the leader of the largest opposition group, tried to hijack last week's massive protest of 100,000 in Belgrade (a rally he had previously shunned), security men from Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement and Zoran Djindjic's Democratic Party openly scuffled. Forging a united front against the regime seems as remote as ever.
The feuds and incompetence of the Serbian opposition are the main reasons why Milosevic still rules. Since the expulsion of a quarter-of-a-million Serbs from Krajina by the Croatian Army in the summer of 1995, less than one-third of the electorate has backed him. But the vanity, greed, and perpetual scheming of the opposition's leaders has left them easy prey for Milosevic's schemes of divide-and-misrule.
Because of this political failure, many fear that Serbia faces civil war. Yet the abyss can be avoided. While the Serbian police force is huge and well-armed, it is ill-trained and psychologically ill-prepared to suppress mass demonstrations. In the Army, only the top generals are unconditionally loyal to Milosevic; most of the officer corps is embittered at the lost Kosovo war and at Milosevic's dismissive treatment of them, particularly their low pay.
Last but not least, it is not obvious that Milosevic is prepared to resort to large scale violence within Serbia. As opposed to his dealings with non-Serbs, this wily authoritarian's preferred methods of domestic political struggle are unscrupulous manipulation of friend and foe, bribery, propaganda, and electoral fraud. Almost sixty years-old and in power for more than a decade, he is unlikely to change. After all, although many believed that his indictment by the Hague War Crimes Tribunal, announced during the bombing of Serbia, would make him fight to the bitter end, he yet accepted unconditional surrender.
Here is Milosevic's Achilles heel. The irony of last Thursday's opposition rally is that it took place in front of Belgrade's federal parliament, for it is in parliament and not the streets that Milosevic can be challenged. In this regard, it is a pity that Montenegro's pro-Western president Milo Djukanovic has chosen a separatist path, rather than help Serbia's opposition.
For Djukanovic holds a possible key to eviscerating Milosevic's stranglehold on government. Because there are no direct elections for the top two federal offices in what remains of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro agreed in 1992 to share them. If the Yugoslav president is Serbian, the premier must be from Montenegro. The trouble with current premier Momcilo Bulatovic is that his party gained fewer votes in Montenegro's elections than Djukanovic's party. He got his job because Milosevic fiddled. Almost all Serb opposition leaders agree with Djukanovic's complaint that the federal government is illegitimate because of this state of affairs.
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Djukanovic prefers an illegitimate federal government because it strengthens his argument for secession. But if he were to work with Serbia's opposition (by pledging, say, to postpone Montenegro's bid for independence if a legitimate prime minister is named), and focus public protests on installing a new premier, Yugoslavia could rid itself of Milosevic in a rather elegant way.
Since the Constitution of Yugoslavia gives little power to the president, a new premier from Montenegro could adopt the opposition's agenda. Milosevic would be squeezed into a ceremonial presidential role. Once Milosevic was stripped of real power, his Socialist Party would seek a new leader; the road would be open for Milosevic's removal.
Djukanovic is a perfect figure to lead the opposition because, as a Montenegin, he poses no threat to the career ambitions within Serbia of Draskovic, Djindjic, and retired General Momcilo Perisic. But Djukanovic keeps the Serbian opposition at a distance. So many opposition politicians hope to get rid of Milosevic through street protests.
The most vocal advocate of this is Mladjan Dinkic, the energetic leader of an economic think tank called G 17. He argues that street protests should combine with a general strike. Parliament would then vote Milosevic and the government out and appoint a government of experts. These would struggle with Serbia's problem for one year, then withdraw from public life. Elections would be held and democratic politics would begin.
The naive part of this plan is the assumption that MPs from Milosevic's Socialist Party, the Yugoslav United Left (the small but influential party of Mrs. Milosevic) and Vojislav Seselj's ultra-nationalist Radical Party, would vote against their government and for a new one from which they could not benefit. Even if this miracle were to happen, who can prevent these MPs from voting against the new government in a few months or only a few weeks time? Finally, Serbs like leaders who can inspire and communicate with them. They would never follow unknown technocrats.
The governing coalition of President Milosevic seems ready to accept early elections. Perhaps it fears that its popularity will further decline, and would prefer to go into elections while it still has the advantages of counting the votes, controlling state television, and establishing electoral districts.
That part of the opposition led by Draskovic also wants elections, but doesn't reject the idea of an interim government. This, Draskovic says, should result from a compromise between Milosevic and the opposition. Draskovic is right. Unless Montenegro's Djukanovic can be prevailed upon to work with the opposition in order to strip Milosevic of power by stripping him of his puppet prime minister, elections and compromises are the way to a democratic Serbia. Street protests should concentrate on getting from Milosevic fair conditions for elections and acceptance of international monitoring (but, needless to say, not from NATO countries).
In this way, even without joining into a coalition, opposition parties could get a majority of seats in parliament. What the new government would then look like is difficult to know, but it certain that Milosevic would not be its leader.