Bernard Haykel
Says More…
This week in Say More, PS talks with Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern Studies and Director of the Institute for the Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia at Princeton University.
Project Syndicate: In 2016, you noted that “the tensions between [Iran and Saudi Arabia] go back many decades, but they became especially acute after Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979.” How is the election of the hardline Ebrahim Raisi as Iran’s new president likely to affect the country’s strategic rivalry with the Saudis?
Bernard Haykel: There are structural reasons why Saudi Arabia and Iran will remain rivals, regardless of who is in power in Tehran and Riyadh. Both are large countries with leadership claims based on their respective geopolitical heft and on Islam. As oil-producing countries, both have significant resources at their disposal. And they have very different visions for the region’s security architecture.
Whereas Saudi Arabia is keen on maintaining regional stability through the perpetuation of a US military presence, Iran seeks to expel the United States, in the name of anti-imperialism. Iran cannot drive the US out with military action, but it can raise the costs of staying. In fact, US President Joe Biden’s commitment to reducing America’s military footprint in the Middle East partly reflects Iran’s success in bleeding America.
The election of Raisi does nothing to change these structural factors. But it could raise tensions further. Because of Raisi’s hardline reputation, Iran’s proxies – from the Houthis in Yemen to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Hamas movement in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and various Shia militias in both Syria and Iraq – are likely to ratchet up their anti-US and anti-Saudi activities. The key challenge will be to prevent this from escalating into yet more war, which could drag the US back into the fray and bring additional misery to the region’s long-suffering peoples.
PS: In 2019, you argued that America’s retreat from the Middle East has left a “strategic vacuum,” which Iran and Saudi Arabia (and Turkey) are “vying to fill.” Today, in keeping with that retreat, Biden has accelerated the timetable for a full military withdrawal from Afghanistan. What are the biggest risks of this effort, and how should they be mitigated?
BH: Periods of transition from one security framework to another are fraught with danger. If the US genuinely abandons the Persian Gulf region, clashes – possibly even wars – will become inevitable. After all, this region has more than half of the world’s proven oil reserves and an extraordinary amount of natural gas. If these valuable assets are not adequately protected, states are bound to compete over them. Recall, for example, when Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait in 1990.
The only way to mitigate this danger is for the US – perhaps together with other powers, such as China, Japan, India, and the European Union – to make clear that any disruption to the region’s energy supply will be regarded as a direct challenge to global security and will not be tolerated. This is in America’s own interest. Many in the US believe that, because of shale oil and gas, they are insulated from what happens in the Gulf, but this is pure fantasy. The US depends on a reliable global energy market, which in turn depends on stability in the Persian Gulf region. Fortunately, I don’t believe that the US will completely abandon the Persian Gulf region anytime soon.
PS: Last year, you wrote that Saudi Arabia’s decision to crank up oil production reflects the view of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the country’s de facto ruler, that the Kingdom has a “relatively narrow window of opportunity to monetize its large oil reserves.” Once this strategy runs its course – a process that you suggest could take just two decades – what energy strategy is MBS likely to pursue, and how might it affect Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the US?
BH: The Saudis are convinced of two things. First, the last barrel of oil to be sold in the world will be theirs, because they are the world’s lowest-cost oil producer. And, second, they must do everything in their power to ensure that this doesn’t happen when they still have oil left in the ground.
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To avoid being left with huge amounts of stranded assets, the Saudis (and the other Gulf producers) are likely to ramp up their production over the next decade. At the same time, the Saudi Aramco IPO has enabled them to monetize their oil reserves before prices plummet. They will continue to sell off more of their national oil company for this reason.
If my predictions prove accurate, producers that face higher production costs – including the US, but also Canada, Russia, and others – will be outsold by the Saudis and the other Gulf producers, especially as the increasing availability of alternative energy sources and tighter regulations on fossil fuels strangle the oil market.
We are in the midst of a period of extraordinary transition, from the fossil-fuel age to something entirely different, and the Saudis are key players in this process, which will take several decades to unfold. The Kingdom, as well as every other oil-producing country, must think hard about how to mitigate the negative effects of this transition. The decisions they make in this area will affect every person on the planet.
PS: You have praised Biden’s “softer” approach to Saudi Arabia, reflected in his decision not to impose sanctions on the country over a CIA assessment that MBS had approved the 2018 killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi. This was important, because the bilateral relationship is based on “mutual interests,” such as “ending the war in Yemen and rebuilding the country.” Practically, how should Saudi Arabia go about advancing this goal? What can the US do to spur progress?
BH: I am convinced that the Biden administration’s approach to Saudi Arabia is much better than that of his predecessor, Donald Trump. Whereas Trump was highly transactional and personalistic, Biden emphasizes institutional ties and structural interests. And the US and Saudi Arabia are clearly bound by profound shared interests, three of which I alluded to above: regional stability, energy security, and US supremacy.
Ending the war in Yemen is another goal both countries share. There is no obvious way to achieve this without engaging the Houthi movement that now controls nearly all of northern Yemen. To convince the Houthis to cooperate, the US and Saudi Arabia would have to provide guarantees that they will remain a prominent force in ruling the country.
Even more important, the Kingdom and the US must try to convince all Yemenis of the merits of peace, and pursue an agenda to ameliorate their plight. This includes a unilateral cease-fire, an end to the economic blockade, significant annual humanitarian and development aid for a prolonged period – say, over a decade – and Yemen’s entry into the Gulf Cooperation Council. Most Yemenis could rally around such a deal, because they’ll all have a stake in its success. While this might not end the war, it would be a good start.
BY THE WAY . . .
PS: What other changes to America’s Saudi Arabia strategy should Biden be pursuing?
BH: America’s Saudi Arabia policy has always been complicated and fraught. On one hand, the US has important interests that it needs the Kingdom to help pursue and protect, including regional stability, energy security, and counter-terrorism. On the other, the US has values it wishes to promote and safeguard, such as human rights, democracy, and accountable and transparent governance.
The Saudis, for their part, are keen to preserve their sovereignty; they consider foreign interference in their domestic affairs unacceptable. They have also wished to promote the rights of the Palestinian people against Israeli violations.
There will always be tensions in the US-Saudi relationship. Fortunately, the Biden administration appreciates this and appears to be balancing the contradictions rather well. For example, we have seen a number of political dissidents released from Saudi prisons lately, probably partly because of America’s quiet diplomacy. More of this – that is, diplomacy – is what the bilateral relationship needs.
PS: You have often portrayed MBS as a reformer. In what areas are the biggest changes underway?
BH: I visited Saudi Arabia early last month, and the social change in the country is palpable. For starters, one sees women everywhere, working in offices and stores, and many are not veiled. The persistent harassment of women in public, which had been a prominent feature of Saudi street life, seems to be gone.
Moreover, the country now looks like one big construction site, and Saudis are working in jobs that were previously occupied by guest workers. There is clearly an economic transformation afoot. The economy is being diversified away from its heavy reliance not only on oil, but on the government as the principal economic actor and distributor of wealth.
Finally, there has been political change: as MBS has consolidated and centralized power, repression has increased. While the young seem to love MBS and the changes he is bringing, the older generations – say, those above 40 – are less sanguine and more fearful. The climate of relatively more open political criticism that prevailed under the late King Abdullah (2005-2015) is now a thing of the past.
PS: In a 2015 article, you contrasted Saudi Arabia’s ultra-conservative Wahhabi orthodoxy with the Islamic State’s ideology, noting that with the former, the violence was never “wanton.” The Islamic State, by contrast, is striking in its “literalism” and the “assiduous, obsessive seriousness” with which its members read Islamic texts. Today, the Islamic State has largely gone underground. Is its brand of Islam having an enduring impact? Should we expect it to take hold again, whether through a resurgence of the Islamic State or some other group?
BH: Militant Islamism, whether represented by al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, is a product of several factors. Two stand out. The first is the effort of the US and Saudi Arabia during the Cold War to promote Islamism as a counter-ideology to leftist nationalism and communism. The second is America’s direct involvement in wars, such as the one in Iraq, which shattered Middle Eastern societies and helped radicalize their populations.
Now, the Cold War is well and over, and the US is, one hopes, ready to stop fighting wars in the Middle East. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has effectively turned off the ideological and financial tap for the Islamists. State sponsorship of ideologies and movements (such as Iran’s sponsorship of Hezbollah) remains the principal factor in the rise and persistence of these groups. I’m quite optimistic that once Iran, Turkey, and Qatar follow the example now set by Saudi Arabia – namely, ending the promotion of Islamism – we will see these movements fade into irrelevance.
PS: You grew up between Lebanon and the US. Are there insights into the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula that your background enables – and that Western commentators often miss?
BH: My knowledge of the local language (Arabic), as well as local customs, history, and cultural references, provides me with a huge advantage over foreigners. Saudi Arabia and Yemen, in particular, are difficult societies to understand and appreciate. Because neither country was colonized, certain cultural features have persisted in a way that they couldn’t have in a society like Lebanon, which has been thoroughly penetrated and transformed by the West.
The most disappointing aspect of a lot of Western commentary about the societies of the Arabian Peninsula – as well as that of many Lebanese and Egyptian journalists and scholars – is the persistent stereotyping of Saudis or Yemenis as backward Bedouin folk or intolerant Islamic fundamentalists. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Arabian societies are remarkably rich and diverse, and I have a genuine passion for trying to describe them to others. But there is no substitute for learning a country’s language and spending time with its people. This is what I have tried to do, and I have made many friends in both Yemen and Saudi Arabia as a result. Thanks to these efforts, I have a deep affection for both countries.
Haykel recommends
We ask all our Say More contributors to tell our readers about a few books that have impressed them recently. Here are Haykel's picks:
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Vision or Mirage: Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads
by David Rundell
This is the best recently published book on Saudi Arabia. It is written by a former US diplomat who has spent nearly two decades living there, and the story he tells is nuanced and well researched. It also offers a balanced view of the recent transformation – one that avoids the polemics that have swirled around MBS.
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Rediscovering the Islamic Classics: How Editors and Print Culture Transformed an Intellectual Tradition
by Ahmed El Shamsy
Arab cultures long depended on manuscripts, meaning that the choices modern editors made regarding which manuscripts to edit and publish have had an enduring religious and political impact. This brilliant academic work examines that impact, and shows how the transition from manuscripts to printed books transformed modern Arab and Islamic intellectual and political life.
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Modern Things on Trial: Islam’s Global and Material Reformation in the Age of Rida, 1865–1935
by Leor Halevi
This, too, is a stunning academic work about the development and adaptation of Islamic intellectual and legal thought to modernity. It studies the life and writings of Muhammad Rashid Rida, a hugely influential figure in modern Islamic thought. Like El Shamsy’s book, it provides powerful insights into recent trends and ideas in the Arab and Islamic worlds.
From the PS Archive
In “Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?”, Haykel reviews the Kingdom's plans to ween itself off of oil, and finds it lacking on the political front. Read more.
In “The Middle East’s Cold War,” Haykel traces the battle lines in the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Read more.
Around the web
In this 2019 New Yorker interview, Haykel describes personal conversations he had with MBS before and after Khashoggi’s murder. Read the interview.
Winter Sale: Save 40% on a new PS subscription
At a time of escalating global turmoil, there is an urgent need for incisive, informed analysis of the issues and questions driving the news – just what PS has always provided.
Subscribe to Digital or Digital Plus now to secure your discount.
