With her energetic demeanor, fluid delivery, and skillful handling of her opponent, US Vice President Kamala Harris came across very differently in her recent debate against Donald Trump than US President Joe Biden did in June. But it is not only presentation that sets Harris apart from Biden, let alone Trump.

While there is “plenty of overlap” between Harris and Biden’s worldviews and foreign-policy preferences, writesIan Bremmer, Founder and President of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, there is also “significant daylight” between them. In particular, Harris is far less inclined to view international relations as a “struggle between democracies and autocracies,” with the US “always” acting as a “force for good.” When it comes to exercising power in a “more contested and multipolar world,” she is warier of “unintended consequences” and would probably favor “multilateral approaches over unilateral interventions.”

Trump certainly does not share Harris’s commitment to multilateralism, points outJoseph S. Nye, Jr., of the Aspen Strategy Group. To be sure, “there will be large areas of continuity in US foreign policy” no matter who wins in November, such as with regard to China. But whereas Harris would work to reinforce US alliances and promote multilateralism, Trump would most likely embrace unilateralism, particularly on issues such as NATO to Ukraine.

For Anders Åslund, a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum, Trump’s “promises to end the [Ukraine] war in a day” are a matter of serious concern, as they imply “complete capitulation to the Kremlin.” Harris, however, has an opportunity to “turn today’s horrendous war of attrition into a Ukrainian victory.” The key is a “comprehensive strategy backed by sufficient resources, all of which are already available in the form of frozen Russian assets.”

Trump’s affinity for isolationism would also have far-reaching economic consequences, explains Columbia Business School’s Shang-Jin Wei, who thinks a Republican victory would mean “another negative shock to global trade,” with “far more losers than winners.” As for Harris, she might also “advance America’s relative decline as a trading country,” though not as quickly as Trump, if she decided to maintain Biden’s approach to trade. If, on the other hand, she were to embrace a “relatively open trade policy,” she could “usher in a global trade revival that boosts the US economy and enhances US global leadership.”

Likewise, Nobel laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz sees little reason to doubt that Harris would be better for the US economy than Trump. Whereas Trump’s “stated objectives and ill-considered policy proposals” would make the US economy “weaker, less competitive, and less equal,” Harris would probably “preserve the central tenets” of Biden’s program, characterized by objectives like vigorous antitrust enforcement, reducing the cost of living, and mitigating inequality. Moreover, Harris appears far better equipped to “respond to shocks and seize new opportunities.”

But even setting aside Harris’s virtues, notes MIT’s Daron Acemoglu, there is one very compelling reason to support the Democratic ticket: Trump “poses such a serious threat to US institutions that any halfway decent candidate running against him would deserve strong support.” That threat has only grown since Trump’s first presidential term, and the only way to eliminate it is to use “democratic means” to prevent him from getting a second.

NEW YORK – Following President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the 2024 presidential race and Vice President Kamala Harris’s ascension to the top of the Democratic ticket, a crucial question emerges: How would Harris’s foreign policy depart from Biden’s?

Biden entered the White House as the most experienced and knowledgeable foreign-policy president of our generation. A longtime member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he played a vocal role in national-security debates for decades, and then spearheaded key diplomatic initiatives as Barack Obama’s vice president. Harris’s pre-White House foreign-policy resume – career prosecutor, state attorney general, first-term senator – was decidedly sparse by comparison.

But her four years as vice president have provided a crash course in international relations that few Democrats or Republicans can match. She has received the President’s Daily Brief every morning, sat in on most of Biden’s meetings with visiting heads of state and government, and been present in the Situation Room when critical national-security decisions were made. She has also traveled to more than 20 countries, met with more than 150 foreign leaders, and led many key delegations herself – including the past three to the Munich Security Conference.

Through the pandemic, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, intensifying great-power competition with China, the latest Middle East war, and numerous smaller crises, US allies and partners have come to see her as a steady, capable hand. Even if they do not rank her as highly as Biden, whom they’ve known for decades and – in many cases – grown fond of, they certainly see her as far more capable and reliable than Donald Trump.

But how do her worldview and policy preferences compare to Biden’s? There is plenty of overlap, but also significant daylight between them. Biden, now 81, came of age at the height of the Cold War, and his worldview reflects this. He is a strong believer in “American exceptionalism,” and he views international relations in black-and-white terms – namely as a struggle between democracies and autocracies – where the United States is always a force for good. He is also a believer in the “great man” theory of politics, which posits that statesmen like him can alter the course of events through personal relationship-building and sheer force of will.

By contrast, the 59-year-old Harris grew up in a post-Cold War world where the greatest challenge to American hegemony was a failure to uphold its ideals at home and abroad. Her inclination as a prosecutor is to judge countries by their adherence to the rule of law and international norms, rather than by their political system or leaders. Recognizing the necessity of US engagement with non-democratic countries and acknowledging America’s own democratic shortcomings, she views Biden’s “democracies vs. autocracies” framework as reductive, hypocritical, and unrealistic.

Though Harris agrees with Biden that the US is generally a force for good, she is wary of unintended consequences and favors multilateral approaches over unilateral interventions. She also believes that leading by example is the most effective way for America to exercise power in a more contested and multipolar world, where the US is still the global hegemon but lacks the ability, will, and legitimacy to dictate outcomes the way it once did.

These contrasting worldviews manifest differently across policy areas. On China, continuity is the order of the day. US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan explicitly assured Chinese President Xi Jinping of that in a rare meeting late last month. Biden and Harris are fully aligned on engaging with China wherever cooperation is possible, while competing vigorously but in close coordination with allies on national security-related issues. Any differences in policy between them are likely to be just a matter of emphasis or tactics.

As vice president, for example, Harris expended considerable effort in shoring up America’s Indo-Pacific relationships, traveling four times to Asia and meeting regularly with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. Her administration would prioritize alliance-building over unilateral measures (such as tariffs, export controls, and sanctions), intensifying the “pivot to Asia” beyond Biden’s approach.

The Russia-Ukraine war is a different story. Harris and Biden align in supporting Ukraine, but their motivations differ. Whereas Harris sees the conflict in legal terms, emphasizing Russia’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, Biden views it through a moral lens, casting it as a struggle between democracy and autocracy. This underlying difference in perspective could lead to a policy divergence under changing circumstances. While Harris would accept a bilateral ceasefire agreement, she would be less likely than Biden – whose personal relationship with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is tepid at best – to pressure Ukraine into unwanted negotiations, especially while Ukrainian territory remains under illegal occupation.

The Israel-Palestine issue marks the most significant foreign-policy divide between Biden and his vice president. Harris is more sensitive to alleged Israeli violations of international law (committed with US complicity) in Gaza and the West Bank. She is also generally more supportive of Palestinian statehood than Biden, who nominally favors a two-state solution but has been all too deferential to Israel’s far-right prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu.

While Harris would continue to recognize Israel as America’s most important regional security partner and ensure its ability to defend itself, she would exert more pressure on its government to uphold the rule of law. This different approach to the “special relationship” would represent a break from past administrations, but it would align US policy more closely with that of most of its allies.

As the election nears, Harris’s potential to shape global affairs for the next four or eight years is coming into sharper focus. Though often aligned with Biden, her unique worldview promises a distinct form of leadership on the international stage.

CAMBRIDGE – As the US presidential election draws near, many are wondering what it will mean for American foreign policy. The answer is wrapped in uncertainty.

First, who will win the election? At the beginning of the summer, polls showed Donald Trump well ahead of President Joe Biden. But now that Vice President Kamala Harris has become the Democratic Party candidate, polls show her with a slight lead. The problem, of course, is that if voter sentiments can swing so quickly, predicting where will they lie on November 5 is all but impossible. While Harris has demonstrated impressive political skill, democratic politics is full of surprises.

Second, foreign leaders and actors also have a “vote,” in the sense that their behavior can suddenly change the US agenda and the probabilities of various outcomes. The modest foreign policy that George W. Bush outlined during his 2000 campaign was nothing like the policy that he pursued after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Who knows what kind of surprise Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping might have in store.

Campaign statements do provide some hints about policy, of course. If Harris wins, one can expect a continuation of Biden’s policy, albeit with some adjustments. She seems to place less emphasis on promoting democracy – one of Biden’s biggest themes – and she says a bit more about Palestinian rights. Generally, though, she would pursue the same policy of reinforcing US alliances and promoting multilateralism.

Trump is more unpredictable. While all politicians stretch the truth, he is notorious in this regard. It is difficult to know which statements might become policy. His rhetoric about unilateralism and downgrading alliances and multilateral institutions tells us something about the tenor of his foreign policy, but it does not answer questions about specific issues.

Observers often try to improve their predictions by looking at the candidates’ advisers. Harris’s top foreign-policy hand is Philip Gordon, a pragmatic, highly respected centrist who handled European and the Middle Eastern affairs in prior Democratic administrations before becoming the vice president’s chief foreign-policy adviser.

By contrast, it is difficult to identify a comparable figure in the Trump camp – though the press sometimes mentions Robert O’Brien, Trump’s last national-security adviser. What we do know is that Trump regrets having appointed traditional Republicans to key roles during his previous term, since they duly curtailed his freedom of action and made his policies more moderate than he wished.

It is also worth noting some similarities between the two candidates. Most important are their positions on China. There is now a broad bipartisan consensus that China has not played fair on trade and intellectual-property issues, and that its assertive behavior in the East and South China Seas is threatening American allies like Japan and the Philippines. China has said many times that it would not rule out the use of force in seizing Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province. In many ways, Biden continued Trump’s China policy, and Harris would likely do the same, with some adjustments.

A second similarity between the candidates is their rejection of neoliberal economic policies. During Trump’s presidency, the US abandoned the traditional (Reagan-era) Republican approach to trade, increased tariffs, and downgraded participation in the World Trade Organization. This was all done under the guidance of US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, who remains influential in Trump’s circle.

Trump also spurned the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Barack Obama had negotiated, and Biden then did nothing to rejoin that agreement or to remove Trump’s tariffs on imports from China. In fact, Biden went further by introducing new technology-focused export controls against China (billed as erecting a “high fence around a small yard”). With her own ties to the US tech industry as a Californian, Harris is unlikely to lower the fence. And Trump, if anything, will expand the yard.

Moreover, both Trump and Harris have pledged to increase American hard power – militarily and economically – through investments in the defense budget and the defense industrial base. Both also can be expected to continue the current nuclear-weapons modernization program, and to promote the development of new weapons that use artificial intelligence.

One of the biggest differences concerns the candidates’ positions on Europe. Trump and his running mate, J.D. Vance, have made it clear that they have little interest in supporting Ukraine and NATO. Trump claims that he would end the war quickly through negotiations, and it is difficult to see how this could be done without weakening Ukraine dramatically.

In the Middle East, both candidates have pledged to maintain Israel’s security and its right to self-defense, though Harris also speaks of a Palestinian right to self-determination. Both probably would urge Saudi Arabia to proceed with normalizing relations with Israel, and both would take a tough line on Iran. But whereas Trump assigns low priorities to Africa and Latin America, Harris could be expected to pay more attention to those regions.

The most dramatic difference concerns American soft power: the ability to secure desired outcomes through persuasion rather than coercion or payment. During his presidency, Trump opted for an “America First” unilateralism that led other countries to conclude that their interests were not being considered. He also openly rejected multilateralism, most dramatically by withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement and the World Health Organization. Biden reversed those moves, but Trump would probably reverse the reversal, whereas Harris would maintain American participation. She also would be more likely than Trump to issue statements promoting human rights and democracy.

In short, there will be large areas of continuity in US foreign policy no matter who wins the election. But the differences between the candidates’ attitudes toward alliances and multilateralism are significant – and that could make all the difference.

STOCKHOLM – By providing Ukraine with early military, political, and financial support, US President Joe Biden’s administration saved it from being overrun by Russia. Yet since November 2022, the conflict has been locked in a stalemate, which is not to Ukraine’s advantage. If elected, Kamala Harris should make it an explicit goal to turn today’s horrendous war of attrition into a Ukrainian victory. Ukraine’s surprising offensive in Russia’s Kursk region may be the beginning of a more promising development.

Ukraine’s own goals are clear: to restore full territorial integrity; to allow all displaced Ukrainian citizens – including the thousands of children kidnapped by Russia – to return; and to receive full compensation for the damage Russia has caused. By contrast, the United States currently has no strategy to speak of. The Biden administration merely claims that it will support Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” whereas Harris’s Republican challenger, Donald Trump, promises to end the war in a day, implying complete capitulation to the Kremlin.

For Harris, the current impasse is an opportunity. Two-thirds of Americans are rooting for Ukraine’s victory, and she has already dealt extensively with Ukraine, having met President Volodymyr Zelensky six times and led the US delegation to the Ukraine Peace Summit in Switzerland in June. As US vice president, she has followed Biden’s lead; but as president, she could turn the war around and make Ukraine one of her big winning issues.

Doing so will require a comprehensive strategy backed by sufficient resources. The Biden administration’s policy (presumably the work of National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan) is to defend Ukraine without provoking Russian President Vladimir Putin. Owing to irrational fears about nuclear attacks or World War III, the White House has created imaginary Russian red lines, thus offering Russia a sanctuary from Ukrainian attacks with Western arms. But given that Putin would not survive a nuclear war, he is exceedingly unlikely to go down that path.

Another fundamental shortcoming of the Biden policy is the lack of any clear goal. The goal should be to provide Ukraine with enough support to defeat Russia. Harris should appoint a national security adviser who is whole-heartedly committed to that objective. The Ukrainians are bravely fighting on their own. They are not calling for foreign troops; but they do need potent arms, the right to use them to target Russian bases, and sufficient funding from the West.

Ukraine received about $100 billion in 2023 (half of it military assistance, and the rest budget support and humanitarian aid), and it is on track to receive around the same amount in 2024. While substantial, that is not enough to tip the balance. For an outright victory, Ukraine would probably need $150 billion per year, with a doubling of military support to $100 billion. That would equip it to win the war, which would then reduce future costs (not to mention Ukrainian suffering).

It is no secret where such funding can be found. The West has frozen $280 billion in Russian reserves, two-thirds of which are held in the private Euroclear system in Belgium. Moreover, the US Congress has sensibly passed legislation authorizing the Department of the Treasury to seize frozen Russian assets, while demanding that the European Union do the same. But the EU has refused, owing mainly to opposition from France and Germany.

This European resistance makes no sense. With Russia violating international law on a daily basis, the Kremlin cannot credibly demand the protection of international law. Like the US, the EU needs to adopt legislation allowing for Russian funds to be seized and used to support Ukraine. Though only around $5 billion has been located in the US, that money can be seized and delivered to Ukraine immediately to set an example for the Europeans. True, in June, the US persuaded other G7 members to lend Ukraine $50 billion by drawing on the future yields from frozen Russian funds. That was a good start. But Ukraine needs the money as soon as possible to defeat Russia.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, the US, the United Kingdom, and Canada were Ukraine’s primary sources of military aid and training. During the war’s early months, they were understandably reluctant to furnish the Ukrainians with the most sophisticated arms, for fear that Russia would seize them. But these fears were alleviated by the summer of 2022. For two years now, the US could have been providing Ukraine with the weapons it needed to push the Russians back.

Very little will happen unless America leads. The US remains globally dominant in arms production and exports, whereas the Europeans have too few arms to change the balance in the war.

Finally, we come to the most absurd flaw in America’s Ukraine policy: the prohibition against using US-supplied weapons to hit Russian bases from which Ukraine is being attacked. This policy is not even in keeping with the right to self-defense enshrined in the UN Charter. It should be revoked immediately.

The war in Ukraine could be a boon for Harris, but she must correct Biden’s mistakes and provide the additional resources Ukraine needs to defeat Russia. By seizing Russian sovereign assets and persuading US allies to do the same, she can help Ukraine win without placing any additional budgetary burden on Americans.

NEW YORK – A major uncertainty looming over the global economy is who will be the next US president. While the United States is home to only 5% of the world’s population, and contributes just 15% of global value added, its role in shaping the world economy is unmatched. Given this, the trade policies of the next administration – whether led by US Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump – will undoubtedly have significant spillover effects.

We know what Trump is likely to do: raise US tariffs on imports from China to 60%, and impose a 10% tariff on imports from all other countries. These policies would hurt Chinese exports to the US the most, but many other countries’ US exports would also decline, though a few – those providing substitutes for Chinese goods – might benefit.

Economies that depend on supply chains that include China would also suffer. Many South Korean and Japanese firms export parts and components to China, where they are combined with China-made parts and components, and possibly assembled into final products, for export to the US and elsewhere. This implies that any reduction in Chinese exports to the US would translate into a reduction in exports from Japan, South Korea, and others like them. Efforts to bypass the problem by shifting supply chains to India, Vietnam, and elsewhere might partly offset this effect, but such solutions are likely to be both costly and incomplete.

The effects of the “Trump trade shock” would not end there. If the tariffs hamper growth in China, Chinese demand for imports could fall, dealing yet another a blow to economies for which China is a leading trading partner, such as Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian countries.

Trump’s proposed tariffs would also have two less obvious effects – neither of which is desirable for the US. First, they would act as a drag on US exports to many countries, because the overall US trade deficit is determined less by America’s own trade policy than by a shortage of US national savings relative to investment. Given that Trump’s proposed tariffs would be unlikely to raise US savings significantly, a reduction in US imports would be matched by a reduction in US exports. With that, America’s relative importance as a trading partner for many countries would decline.

Second, Trump’s tariffs would undermine the world economic order that the US led the way in creating. The Trump measures would violate America’s legal obligations under the World Trade Organization. But, with the US having spent years weakening the WTO’s dispute-settlement mechanism, the body is unlikely to be able to check Trump’s protectionism. This would reinforce the sense that the US does not play by the rules and would encourage other countries – particularly those grappling with high levels of inequality – to implement retaliatory tariffs or other protectionist policies. (Populist politicians often tout trade barriers as a solution to inequality.)

The contours of Harris’s likely trade policy are less clear. One can imagine her upholding US President Joe Biden’s approach to trade, which is slightly less erratic than Trump’s, but remains a blight on Biden’s economic-policy legacy. In fact, a continuation of Biden’s policies would still advance America’s relative decline as a trading country, just not as quickly as Trump’s tariffs would.

But there is another possibility. Taking inspiration from two other recent Democratic presidents, Barack Obama and Bill Clinton, Harris might seek to revive US leadership in global trade, not least by rejoining the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), with Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.

The CPTPP evolved from the Trans-Pacific Partnership – an agreement that Obama spearheaded, but was never ratified, owing to Trump’s 2017 decision to withdraw from it. It was thanks to the Japanese leadership that the CPTPP was ratified the following year.

Beyond expanding market access among member countries, the CPTPP imposes institutional requirements affecting the conduct of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), government procurement, and subsidy rules. Given this capacity to induce institutional reform within member countries, the CPTPP can be considered a kind of “WTO plus.”

The CPTPP might even drive reform among prospective members. Though China does not currently meet the agreement’s requirements, it has applied to join, signaling its willingness to reform SOEs and market access. A CPTPP that includes China but not the US is hardly in America’s interest.

A Harris administration might also reverse previous administrations’ tariffs on Chinese imports, which amount to a tax on US consumers, especially middle-class and low-income households. Harris must be able to explain to the American public that tariffs are self-defeating, as they raise the cost of living without creating new jobs for American workers.

There is no guarantee that Harris will pick the right trade advisers or overcome protectionist pressures within her party. But if she does – if she combines a relatively open trade policy with domestic redistribution – she may usher in a global trade revival that boosts the US economy and enhances US global leadership. With Trump, by contrast, there is little reason to expect anything more than another negative shock to global trade, resulting in far more losers than winners.

NEW YORK – The US presidential election in November is critical for many reasons. At stake is not just the survival of American democracy, but also sound stewardship of the economy, with far-reaching implications for the rest of the world.

American voters face a choice not only between different policies, but between different policy objectives. While Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic nominee, has yet to detail her economic agenda fully, she likely would preserve the central tenets of President Joe Biden’s program, which include strong policies to maintain competition, preserve the environment (including reducing greenhouse-gas emissions), reduce the cost of living, maintain growth, enhance national economic sovereignty and resilience, and mitigate inequality.

By contrast, her opponent, former President Donald Trump, has no interest in creating a more just, robust, and sustainable economy. Instead, the Republican ticket is offering a blank check to coal and oil companies and cozying up to billionaires like Elon Musk and Peter Thiel. It is a recipe for making the US economy weaker, less competitive, and less equal.

Moreover, while sound economic stewardship requires setting goals and designing policies to achieve them, the ability to respond to shocks and seize new opportunities is no less important. We already have a sense of how each candidate would perform in this regard. Trump failed miserably in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic during his previous administration, resulting in more than a million deaths. At a time when the United States was desperately in need of leadership, he suggested that people should inject bleach.

Responding to unprecedented events requires difficult judgment calls based on the best science. In Harris, the US has someone who would be thoughtful and pragmatic in weighing the trade-offs and devising balanced solutions. In Trump, we have an impulsive narcissist who thrives on chaos and rejects scientific expertise.

Consider his response to the challenge posed by China: a proposal to introduce blanket tariffs of 60% or more. As any serious economist could have told him, this would increase prices – not just for the goods imported directly from China, but also for the innumerable other goods containing Chinese inputs. Thus, lower- and middle-income Americans would bear the brunt of the cost. As inflation rises and the US Federal Reserve is forced to raise interest rates, the economy would be hit by the triple whammy of slowing growth, rising inflation, and higher unemployment.

Making matters worse, Trump has adopted the extreme position of threatening the Fed’s independence (which is not surprising, considering his committed efforts to undermine the independence of the judiciary and the civil service). Another Trump presidency thus would introduce a persistent source of economic uncertainty, depressing investment and growth, and almost certainly increasing inflation expectations.

Trump’s proposed tax policies are equally fraught. Recall the 2017 tax cut for corporations and billionaires, which failed to stimulate additional investment and merely encouraged share buybacks. Although Republicans have never seen a tax cut for the rich that they didn’t love, a few at least recognized that the policy would increase budget deficits, and therefore added a sunset clause, which begins to take effect in 2025. But Trump, ignoring the evidence that “trickle-down” tax cuts don’t work and don’t pay for themselves, wants to renew and then deepen the 2017 cut in ways that would add trillions of dollars to the national debt.

While populist demagogues like Trump do not care about deficits, investors in the US and abroad should be worried. Ballooning deficits from non-productivity-enhancing spending would further add to inflation expectations, undercut economic performance, and exacerbate inequality.

Equally, repealing the Biden administration’s signature Inflation Reduction Act would not only be bad for the environment and US competitiveness in critical sectors vital for the country’s future; it also would eliminate provisions that have lowered the cost of pharmaceuticals, thus increasing the cost of living.

Trump (and the business-oriented judges he appointed) also wants to roll back the Biden-Harris administration’s strong competition policies, which – again – would increase inequality and weaken economic performance by enshrining market power and stifling innovation. And he would scrap initiatives to increase access to higher education through better designed income-contingent student loans, ultimately diminishing investment in the sector that the US most needs to meet the challenges of a twenty-first-century innovative economy.

This brings us to the features of Trump’s agenda that are most troubling for America’s long-term economic success. First, another Trump administration would slash funding for basic science and technology, the source of America’s competitive advantage and rising living standards over the past 200 years. (It should go without saying that the country’s economic strength does not lie in casinos, golf courses, or gaudy hotels.)

During his previous term, Trump proposed major cuts to science and technology almost every year, but non-extremist congressional Republicans blocked these budget reductions. This time, however, would be different, because the Republican Party has become Trump’s personal cult. Worse, the party has declared a jihad against US universities, including leading institutions that advance the frontiers of knowledge, attract the best talent from around the world, and sustain the country’s competitive advantage.

Even worse, Trump is committed to undermining the rule of law, both domestically and internationally. Trump’s long track record of refusing to pay vendors and contractors speaks to his character: he is a bully who will use whatever power he has to rob whoever he can. But it becomes an even bigger problem when he openly supports violent insurrectionists. The rule of law is not just something which we should treasure for itself: it is critical for a well-functioning economy and democracy.

Heading into the fall of 2024, it is impossible to know what shocks the economy will face in the next four years. But this much is clear: the economy of 2028 will be much stronger, more equal, and more resilient if Harris gets elected.

BOSTON – An overhauled Democratic ticket has re-energized the party and eliminated the widening polling lead that former US President Donald Trump had over his successor, Joe Biden. There is much to admire in Kamala Harris and Tim Walz’s backgrounds, careers, and recent campaign speeches, which have focused on fighting poverty, improving the lot of working people, reclaiming patriotism from Republicans, and strengthening democracy. But even setting aside these virtues, there are good reasons to support the Democratic ticket. After all, the alternative is Trump, who poses such a serious threat to US institutions that any halfway decent candidate running against him would deserve strong support.

Trump threatens American democracy in part because US institutions were not designed to deal with an autocratic populist who is willing to break norms and even laws. As I pointed out in 2017, American voters and civil society are ultimately the only forces that can stop such a figure. Although American democracy withstood Trump’s presidency in 2017-21, he exploited every institutional weakness he could find, deepened the divisions of an already polarized society, and tried to overturn the result of a free and fair election that he lost.

The Democrats successfully reclaimed the White House in the 2020 election, despite Trump’s coup attempt on January 6, 2021, because they had a major advantage: his own incompetence. Although long-standing political norms had been severely damaged, democracy survived.

Trump’s incompetence as president had two dimensions. First, he was incapable of demonstrating any consistency. His only real agenda was to concentrate power in his own hands and elevate and enrich his family and cronies, but he lacked the discipline and focus to see it through. The terrifying implication, of course, is that somebody more disciplined could have done far more damage. Second, Trump failed to win the unconditional personal loyalty of many of his underlings, and that ultimately meant that most of his wildest schemes and decisions were exposed or blocked from within.

Unfortunately, Trump poses a far greater threat to American democracy today for five key reasons. First, he has grown only angrier, which means he will be more determined to concentrate power in his own hands and deploy it against his enemies (real and perceived). If he returns to the White House, he will be not only more vicious but also potentially more consistent in pursuing his personal agenda.

Second, Trump and his ideological fellow travelers will have put much more thought and vetting into high- and mid-level appointees, as they have already done for his implicit governing agenda: the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025. Although Trump claims to renounce this comprehensive policy blueprint, it has already become a valuable tool for identifying potential administration personnel. Supporting the Heritage Foundation’s dark vision is a litmus test, ensuring that no whistleblowers or defenders of democracy can serve as the “adults in the room” this time around.

Third, the GOP is now Trump’s personal cult, which means that local Republican officials across the country will be willing to do whatever he commands. Some may go so far as attempting to rig elections and seize control of local law enforcement and public services. If Trump once again demands that local election officials “find” more votes in his favor, he might just get what he wants.

Fourth, owing to a variety of mistakes by intellectual elites and Democratic Party leaders – such as advocating extreme “woke” positions like open borders, defunding the police, and so forth – many right-leaning, moderate, and non-college voters have concluded that Democrats are left-wing extremists. Those who see the Democrats as lacking patriotism will be much less likely to break with Trump, even though Harris and Walz are taking steps to appeal to them.

Fifth, for all these same reasons, effective civil-society action against Trump has become more difficult. After years in which the left has applied its own ideological purity tests and shamed anyone who falls short, fewer independent voters and moderate Republicans will be willing to join a big-tent anti-Trump coalition. Progressive Democrats could end up standing alone against his unconstitutional or anti-democratic behavior, and that would not be enough.

For all these reasons, Trump’s threat to US institutions must be taken seriously. Once again, the only way to defend American democracy is to use democratic means to defeat him. Democracy thrives when it delivers real-world results and helps people fulfill their aspirations. In practice, that means promoting economic prosperity, security, fairness, competent governance, and stability. The latter is especially important for withstanding periodic shocks and challenges, including threats to democracy itself.

Trump is not the first anti-democratic demagogue to attract a strong following, and he will not be the last. US institutions became stronger after withstanding a proto-fascist challenge from Father Charles Coughlin in the late 1930s; resistance to Black civil rights in the Jim Crow South of the 1950s and 1960s; the segregationist George Wallace’s 1968 presidential run; and Watergate. If Trump is defeated this November, US institutions will emerge stronger once again.

But for democracy to withstand such challenges, there must be good alternatives on the ballot. People must be able to cast a vote for politicians with good track records of solving problems, inspiring people, and defending free institutions. The Harris-Walz ticket looks like it fits the bill. Now begins the hard work of mobilizing people and restoring support for democracy. But the even harder work will be to deliver on the promises of democracy, by combating poverty and inequality, reducing polarization and extremism from both sides, and demonstrating that government does work for the common people.