India's political boldness in seeking peace with Pakistan in their half-century twilight struggle for Kashmir may soon be matched by economic moves equally as daring. Indeed, India is edging toward a truly bold reform: full international convertibility of the rupee. How it goes about this will not only effect India's economic development, but provide object lessons for China as it ponders convertibility in the years ahead.
Since 1991 India has been travelling on a path from rupee devaluation to full convertibility, with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) relaxing a range of foreign-exchange controls. Resident Indians can now maintain a foreign-currency account and invest in shares of foreign companies, while non-resident Indians can repatriate legacy/inheritance assets. Indian companies listed abroad can buy property in foreign countries, and resident firms will be allowed to pre-pay external commercial debt up to US$100 million. Limits on exporters' foreign-currency accounts will be removed, and banks may invest in overseas money and debt markets.
Is India ready for full convertibility? The government is still lagging on its domestic economic reforms. Structural reform and privatization have slowed, eroding investors' confidence. But failure to address structural problems could expose the economy to external shocks in the long term.
Hence it would be premature for India to open up its capital account immediately. Exchange rate stability is the key anchor when a country's reform process is underway. There is, however, little evidence that capital account convertibility has a meaningful impact on a country's growth rate.
With capital-account convertibility, the rupee's exchange rate will be determined more by capital flows than by inflation differentials, as India's inflation rate remains broadly in line with the OECD average of around 3%. Because India is still running a trade deficit, there could be some pressure on the rupee following any negative shock. Although monetary growth is more than twice the rate of real GDP growth, the inflationary risk is probably low because substantial excess capacity exists. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, despite rising output, deflation occurred, which means that India's potential output is expanding.
The moves towards full capital-account convertibility have proceeded in step with impressive growth in India's foreign-currency reserves. Indeed, India's external liquidity position has strengthened dramatically in the past decade. As a result of a current-account surplus and an interest-rate differential of 3-4%, foreign reserves reached $70.3 billion by the end of 2002--enough to cover almost 15 months of imports--up from only US$4 billion in 1990.
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Following the 1991 balance of payments crisis, the rupee's exchange rate was devalued around 20%. Exporters could exchange 30% of their earnings at the market rate. This was subsequently replaced with a two-tier exchange-rate system making the rupee partially convertible--60% of export earnings could be converted at the market exchange rate, and the rest at the RBI's fixed rate (used by the government to finance essential imports like petroleum, cooking oil, fertilizers, and life-saving drugs).
The two-tier exchange-rate system acted as an export tax, but it did not survive for long, giving way to a unified exchange rate on the trade account. Full convertibility on the current account followed in August 1994. The policy debate then turned to capital-account convertibility, with the IMF and the World Bank strongly in favor. In May 1997, the Tarapore Committee on Capital Account Convertibility charted a three-stage liberalization process to be completed by 1999-2000, with an accompanying emphasis on fiscal consolidation, a mandated inflation target, and a strong financial system.
Then the East Asian currency crisis put further action on hold and raised serious questions about when--and whether--to proceed. The sudden meltdown of apparently healthy economies served as a stark reminder that strong external liquidity should not be the driving force towards full convertibility. The downside risk of capital-account liberalization, after all, is higher exchange-rate volatility, and even countries with sound liquidity positions could not prevent a run on their reserves.
The lesson for India is that, in the event of a domestic or external shock, full convertibility could prove to be a costly, short-lived experiment. The fundamental question is whether full convertibility will encourage higher net inflows or outflows of capital.
The downside risk of higher volatility for the rupee is aggravated by some serious problems, including a deficit running at 6% of GDP and the strategic stand-off with Pakistan. Short-term capital outflows--which might occur should either risk worsen--could create greater output volatility. So it is vital for India to increase the inward flow of long-term capital, regardless of whether the capital account is closed or open.
In this context, it is noteworthy that China, with a closed capital account, has foreign-exchange reserves of US$286 billion, four times the size of India's, though China's economy is only double India's size. Nor is full convertibility the key to attracting higher inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). China attracted FDI inflows of US$52.7 billion in 2002--the largest in the world.
India needs to attract higher FDI inflows to help soak up the economy's excess capacity. This underscores the importance for India's financial stability of successful management of the capital account (monitoring inflows and outflows) following any move toward full convertibility. But, in the near term, full capital account convertibility is not in India's interest.
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India's political boldness in seeking peace with Pakistan in their half-century twilight struggle for Kashmir may soon be matched by economic moves equally as daring. Indeed, India is edging toward a truly bold reform: full international convertibility of the rupee. How it goes about this will not only effect India's economic development, but provide object lessons for China as it ponders convertibility in the years ahead.
Since 1991 India has been travelling on a path from rupee devaluation to full convertibility, with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) relaxing a range of foreign-exchange controls. Resident Indians can now maintain a foreign-currency account and invest in shares of foreign companies, while non-resident Indians can repatriate legacy/inheritance assets. Indian companies listed abroad can buy property in foreign countries, and resident firms will be allowed to pre-pay external commercial debt up to US$100 million. Limits on exporters' foreign-currency accounts will be removed, and banks may invest in overseas money and debt markets.
Is India ready for full convertibility? The government is still lagging on its domestic economic reforms. Structural reform and privatization have slowed, eroding investors' confidence. But failure to address structural problems could expose the economy to external shocks in the long term.
Hence it would be premature for India to open up its capital account immediately. Exchange rate stability is the key anchor when a country's reform process is underway. There is, however, little evidence that capital account convertibility has a meaningful impact on a country's growth rate.
With capital-account convertibility, the rupee's exchange rate will be determined more by capital flows than by inflation differentials, as India's inflation rate remains broadly in line with the OECD average of around 3%. Because India is still running a trade deficit, there could be some pressure on the rupee following any negative shock. Although monetary growth is more than twice the rate of real GDP growth, the inflationary risk is probably low because substantial excess capacity exists. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, despite rising output, deflation occurred, which means that India's potential output is expanding.
The moves towards full capital-account convertibility have proceeded in step with impressive growth in India's foreign-currency reserves. Indeed, India's external liquidity position has strengthened dramatically in the past decade. As a result of a current-account surplus and an interest-rate differential of 3-4%, foreign reserves reached $70.3 billion by the end of 2002--enough to cover almost 15 months of imports--up from only US$4 billion in 1990.
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At a time of escalating global turmoil, there is an urgent need for incisive, informed analysis of the issues and questions driving the news – just what PS has always provided.
Subscribe to Digital or Digital Plus now to secure your discount.
Subscribe Now
Following the 1991 balance of payments crisis, the rupee's exchange rate was devalued around 20%. Exporters could exchange 30% of their earnings at the market rate. This was subsequently replaced with a two-tier exchange-rate system making the rupee partially convertible--60% of export earnings could be converted at the market exchange rate, and the rest at the RBI's fixed rate (used by the government to finance essential imports like petroleum, cooking oil, fertilizers, and life-saving drugs).
The two-tier exchange-rate system acted as an export tax, but it did not survive for long, giving way to a unified exchange rate on the trade account. Full convertibility on the current account followed in August 1994. The policy debate then turned to capital-account convertibility, with the IMF and the World Bank strongly in favor. In May 1997, the Tarapore Committee on Capital Account Convertibility charted a three-stage liberalization process to be completed by 1999-2000, with an accompanying emphasis on fiscal consolidation, a mandated inflation target, and a strong financial system.
Then the East Asian currency crisis put further action on hold and raised serious questions about when--and whether--to proceed. The sudden meltdown of apparently healthy economies served as a stark reminder that strong external liquidity should not be the driving force towards full convertibility. The downside risk of capital-account liberalization, after all, is higher exchange-rate volatility, and even countries with sound liquidity positions could not prevent a run on their reserves.
The lesson for India is that, in the event of a domestic or external shock, full convertibility could prove to be a costly, short-lived experiment. The fundamental question is whether full convertibility will encourage higher net inflows or outflows of capital.
The downside risk of higher volatility for the rupee is aggravated by some serious problems, including a deficit running at 6% of GDP and the strategic stand-off with Pakistan. Short-term capital outflows--which might occur should either risk worsen--could create greater output volatility. So it is vital for India to increase the inward flow of long-term capital, regardless of whether the capital account is closed or open.
In this context, it is noteworthy that China, with a closed capital account, has foreign-exchange reserves of US$286 billion, four times the size of India's, though China's economy is only double India's size. Nor is full convertibility the key to attracting higher inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). China attracted FDI inflows of US$52.7 billion in 2002--the largest in the world.
India needs to attract higher FDI inflows to help soak up the economy's excess capacity. This underscores the importance for India's financial stability of successful management of the capital account (monitoring inflows and outflows) following any move toward full convertibility. But, in the near term, full capital account convertibility is not in India's interest.